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The rise of digital platforms has transformed our economy and reshaped consumer 
behaviors and experiences. While practitioners and researchers have a growing 
interest in understanding digital platforms, there is still a dearth of research on how 
platforms can design effective information strategies to mitigate fundamental issues 
such as information asymmetry and search frictions by leveraging granular data. My 
dissertation seeks to fill this gap. Specifically, by focusing on significant real-world 
problems on digital platforms, I aim to examine IT-enabled and analytics-driven 
information strategies and study the impact of these strategies on the users as well as 
on the platforms themselves. In collaboration with two different online platforms, I 
design and conduct three randomized field experiments to investigate the impact of 
informational interventions and provide actionable suggestions. In Essay 1, I examine 
incentive strategies for motivating effective mobile app adoptions, by comparing 
monetary incentives against informational incentives. I find that the usage after app 
adoption depends on how customers are motivated, and only information induced 
adoption leads to long-term increase in purchases. In Essay 2, I investigate the role of 
“verification” when it is made optional, and find that it serves as a very effective 
signaling device, especially in markets that lack other mechanisms such as reputation 
systems. I also find that users on the two sides of online platform use the same signal 
very differently, and that this is attributable to the difference in the credibility of their 
primary signaling-attribute of each side, viz. income in males and beauty in females. 
  
In Essay 3, I examine the effectiveness of three different recommendation systems in 
two-sided matching platforms with a focus on how the provisioning of potential 
candidates’ preference information impacts focal user’s decision-making and 
matching outcomes. I find that compared to “people you might prefer”, users act 
strategically towards “people who might prefer you” and “people who you might 
prefer and who might prefer you” by actively reaching out to less desirable 
candidates, which leads to improved outcomes. In short, the three studies present new 
empirical evidence of how platforms can leverage information as a tool to design 
effective incentives, signaling mechanisms and recommender systems to facilitate 
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Chapter 1: Overview 
 
Online markets and platforms have been gaining momentum and reshaping how 
people interact and trade. Most of today’s biggest and most disruptive firms across 
industries, for instance, Google, Amazon, Ebay, Airbnb, and Uber to name a few 
operate as multi-sided markets or platforms that connect buyers to sellers, hosts to 
travelers, riders to drivers, etc. While there is a growing interest in understanding 
digital platforms, there is still a dearth of research that provides theoretical and 
empirical insights on information strategies that utilize analytics and technology to 
improve product adoption, user engagement and profitability. My dissertation seeks 
to fill this gap. It focuses on designing effective information strategies and artifacts to 
help mitigate fundamental problems of digital markets and to facilitate transactions 
and matches between two sides of the platforms. Specifically, I collaborate with one 
transactional platform and one matching platform to design and conduct three 
randomized field experiments that allow me to draw causal inferences about the 
effectiveness of information strategies and hence provide meaningful business 
implications.  
Online platforms have a pressing need to promote their mobile channel to 
cater to the increasing mobile usage among consumers. In Essay 1, I examine 
effective strategies for mobile app adoptions. I focus on the induced adoption that 
platforms proactively influence through interventions as opposed to those organic 
adoptions where users convert on their own. I compare two most commonly adopted 
motivating strategies, information provisioning and monetary incentive, by designing 
and conducting a large-scale randomized field experiment on a transactional platform. 
I investigate the differential impacts of these two inducements on customers’ mobile 
app adoptions and subsequent purchase behaviors. I find that i) providing monetary 
incentives as well as providing information can both lead to a significant increase in 
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mobile app adoptions; ii) the causal effect of induced mobile app adoptions varies 
greatly depending on how customers are motivated. Although providing monetary 
incentives leads to a larger increase in mobile app adoptions, such induced adoptions 
do not result in more purchases in the long run. In contrast, providing information 
leads to effective mobile adoptions that sustainably increase customers’ purchases, 
and overall profits for the firm. The further examining customers’ multichannel 
purchase behaviors reveals a complementary effect between the mobile app and the 
desktop channel for information-induced app adopters, but a substitution effect 
between the mobile app and the mobile web channel for incentive-induced app 
adopters. For information-induced app adopters, the mobile app serves as a discovery 
tool and helps them find a greater variety of deals. The exploration of the underlying 
drivers of such differential impacts suggests that information, as compared to 
incentives serves as a better sorting device and can attract customers who have a 
greater need for the app and use it more effectively. My findings provide actionable 
insights for firms designing interventions to motivate effective mobile adoptions. 
In Essay 2, I focus on a fundamental challenge faced by online matching 
platforms – information asymmetry, especially for markets with few alternative 
information mechanisms available such as reputation systems and quality assurance. 
While mandatory verification is widely understood as a good assurance in such case, 
in this study I seek to examine a different role of verification – its ability to serve as a 
credible signal for a user, when such verification is made optional and visible to 
others. In collaboration with an online dating platform, I design and conduct a 
randomized field experiment to introduce optional phone verification and I examine 
both ex ante opt-in decisions as well as the ex post impact of verification on 
individual users and the platform. I identify very interesting differential opt-in 
decisions across the two sides of the platform that only males are consistent with the 
conventional prediction of signaling with H-type (i.e., more popular) males being 
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more likely to opt-in to verification. As for females I find M-type females are the 
most likely to opt-in to verification. In examining the underlying mechanism, I find 
that such differential opt-in decisions are related to the difference in the credibility of 
the existing key attribute of each side, viz. income for males and beauty for females. I 
extract beauty of females by applying state-of-the-art deep learning techniques using 
images. Furthermore, I identify an interesting two-pronged effect of verification on 
verified users. On one hand, I find that verified users, especially H-type males and M-
type females, receive more messages from higher type partners. More interestingly, 
upon verification these users become more proactive and reach out to more and better 
potential partners. Further, the introduction of this voluntary verification signal 
facilitates desirable matching outcomes and benefits the platform as a whole. My 
study is among the first to document these differential opt-in decisions and impacts of 
verification across two sides of a matching platform and provide novel insights for 
platforms on optional verification mechanisms and signaling in two-sided markets.  
On decentralized two-sided matching platforms, information seeking plays a 
critical role in determining the efficiency and quality of user matches. Platforms have 
resorted to information technologies to facilitate search and matches, among which 
recommender systems are often deemed as one of the most effective approaches. In 
Essay 3, I focus on user recommendation in two-sided matching markets, 
fundamentally distinctive from product recommendation in transactional markets.  I 
am interested in understanding how recommender systems impact users’ choices and 
final matching outcomes on a two-sided matching platform where a match is a 
bilateral decision involving agreement on both sides. Thus it is useful to examine 
users’ choices and matching outcomes when users are presented with 
recommendations based on i) their own preferences, ii) the preferences of their 
potential matches, or iii) mutual preferences. I collaborate with an online dating 
platform to introduce three recommendation systems providing the aforementioned 
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three types of recommendations based on different preferences. Interestingly, I find 
that users are sensitive to the new information containing potential partner’s 
preferences, and they proactively reach out to these candidates despite the relatively 
low desirability. Such strategic behavior leads to greater increase in matching when 
recommendations are based on potential matches’ preferences compared to 
recommendations based on focal user’s preference. The findings provide valuable 
insights to two-sided matching platforms on how to design user recommendation 
systems beyond the current common practice that considers solely focal user’s 
preference.  
To summarize, my dissertation contributes to the literature regarding digital 
platforms on understanding the role of information strategies and information artifacts 
in users’ decision-making and matching outcomes. Rich user behavior data helps me 
uncover the mechanisms underlying these outcomes. These findings are not only 
theoretically important but also useful to provide insights on how to effectively 
design information strategies to facilitate users’ adoption, search, and matches on 
two-sided platforms. Essay 1 provides actionable insights on the role of information 
and monetary incentives on long-term purchases. It sheds light on multi-channel 
purchase behavior that highlights the complementary role between mobile app 
channel and desktop channel. Essay 2 documents differential opt-in decisions and the 
impacts of verification for males and females in a matching market. It highlights the 
value of optional verification that serves as a credible signal and adds understanding 
to the literature of signaling regarding how users on the two sides of a market may 
use the same signal differently. Essay 3 extends the current literature regarding 
recommender systems to user recommendation and examines how recommender 
systems generating candidates based on potential matches’ preferences would impact 
user’s choices and matching outcomes. The findings provide insights on how to 
design better information-provisioning strategies in two-sided markets. 
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Chapter 2: Motivating Effective Mobile App Adoptions: 
Evidence from a Large-scale Randomized Field Experiment 
	
2.1 Introduction 
The adoption and usage of mobile channels has not only grown significantly, but has 
also altered users’ experience and behaviors in a multi-screen world (Einav et al. 
2014, Fang et al. 2015, Ghose et al. 2012, Luo et al. 2013, Shankar et al. 2016, Xu et 
al. 2016). According to Forbes (2017), mobile commerce in the Nov-Dec 2017 
holiday season is predicted to cross $5 billion, accounting for 54% of retail business 
spending. Recognizing this disruptive effect, firms have been increasing their 
investments in mobile channels, with a strong emphasis on the promotion of their 
own mobile apps (RetailMeNot 2016, Siwicki 2014).  
Prior literature has established a positive association between mobile app 
adoption and business outcomes using observational data. The adoption of mobile 
apps may lead customers to make more purchases (Xu et al. 2016), be more socially 
engaged (Jung et al. 2014) and consume more news (Xu et al. 2014). Given the value 
of mobile app adoptions, a natural question for the firms is: can such findings be put 
into action? In other words, can firms actively influence customers to adopt mobile 
apps, and whether such induced adoptions can lead to an increase in customers’ 
purchases? Further, how should firms induce such adoptions? Two interventions are 
commonly used by firms to encourage technology adoptions: providing information 
about the benefits of the technology (Guiteras et al. 2015) and providing incentives 
for adoption (Cohen et al. 2015). When choosing interventions, firms have two goals 
in mind: 1) increase mobile app adoptions (“coverage”); 2) attract customers who 
need the app more and will use it more effectively (“sorting”). The ideal intervention 
is one that helps achieve high coverage (increased adoption) as well as appropriate 
sorting (effective adoption). However, it is possible that there are inherent tradeoffs 
between the two goals. Despite the huge stakes involved and an active debate about 
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the best intervention strategy (Techcrunch 2015a), no empirical research has 
rigorously investigated this problem. 
My empirical study seeks to fill this gap. Specifically, my study addresses the 
following questions: 
Q1a. (Coverage) What is effect of incentive vs. information on customers’ app 
adoptions?  
Q1b. (Effectiveness) What is the causal effect of induced app adoptions on 
customers’ behaviors in the long run? Does the effect vary for adoptions induced by 
incentive vs. information? 
Q1c. (Profitability) What is the impact of incentive vs. information on firm’s overall 
profitability? 
Q2 (Cross-channel Effect) How do incentive- and information-induced app adoptions 
affect customers’ purchase behaviors across mobile and desktop channels? 
Q3. (Mechanisms) What is the underlying driver of the differences between the 
causal effects of app adoptions induced by incentive vs. information?  
Answers to these questions are valuable as they provide direct managerial 
implications and actionable insights to firms interested in designing active 
interventions to motivate effective mobile app adoptions and improve business 
outcomes. 
It is pertinent to note that the prior studies on mobile channel adoptions have 
not examined the causal effect of induced mobile adoption (e.g. Q1b)1. From a firm’s 
perspective, there are two types of mobile app adopters: 1) those who would adopt 
due to factors beyond the firm’s direct intervention, such as WOM, app quality, etc. 
(defined as ‘organic adopter’), and 2) those who would adopt the app only in response 
to the firm’s direct interventions (defined as ‘induced adopters’). Previous studies 
                                                
1 Q1a, Q1c, Q2, Q3 have also not been addressed in previous studies, most of which use 
observational data. Answer to those questions require both randomized experiments and 
active design of interventions. 
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investigate the effect of observed mobile adoptions (i.e. a mix of ‘organic’ and 
‘induced’ adopters, Xu et al. 2016), rather than induced adoptions. As demonstrated 
in various contexts including technology adoption (Dupas 2014), customer 
acquisition (Datta et al. 2015), and multichannel purchases (Neslin and Shankar 
2009), induced adopters may differ fundamentally from organic adopters in observed 
characteristics such as demographics and historical behaviors. In addition, organic 
adopters of technology may use it in ways different from induced adopters, as such 
organic adoptions may be driven by unobserved needs or preferences. Such 
unobserved needs may drive them to use the app in specific ways that would lead to 
more (or less) purchases. The same may not hold for customers who are nudged or 
incentivized to adopt the app. Consequently, it is not clear whether induced mobile 
adoptions would lead to desirable outcomes and be beneficial to the firms. Since the 
firms can only actively influence induced adoptions (rather than organic adoptions) 
using external interventions, it is crucial to understand the causal effect of induced 
adoptions on customers’ purchase behaviors. More interestingly, the effect of induced 
app adoptions may depend on how customers are motivated to adopt the app. 
Customers have private information about their need for the app (how and how often 
they use the app) and such unobserved ‘customer types’ may determine their long run 
behaviors. Different interventions may encourage different types of customers to 
adopt the app (“sorting”), and may lead to different customer behaviors and business 
outcomes in the long run. Therefore, it is important for firms to understand whether, 
and how, the effect of app adoptions varies for customers induced by different 
interventions, as well as the underlying mechanisms. 
Identifying the causal effect of induced mobile app adoption (Q2), though 
relevant and important, is empirical challenging, for two reasons. First, just using 
observational data on app adoptions one cannot differentiate between organic 
adoptions and induced adoptions. Moreover, the effect of induced adoptions may be 
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confounded by time-varying factors (e.g. concurrent marketing campaigns on 
adoption and purchase). Thus, without exogenous variations in the level of induced 
adoptions, it is extremely difficult to identify its causal effect on customers’ purchase 
behaviors.  
To address these challenges, I collaborate with a leading daily deal platform in 
the US and conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment to examine whether 
and how the firms can effectively induce app adoptions. I randomly choose over 
230,000 customers who have never downloaded the firm’s mobile app and randomly 
assign eligible users into one of three experimental groups: Control group with no 
information or incentives, Treatment 1 with an email highlighting incentives for 
adoption (5 deal bucks), and Treatment 2 with an email highlighting information 
about the benefits of discovering deals using mobile apps. The exogenous variation 
created by the experiment not only allows us to monitor the cohort of induced 
adopters over time and identify the causal effect of app adoptions induced by the 
different interventions (Q1b,c), but also facilitates a straightforward comparison of 
the effect of interventions on app adoptions and firm profitability (Q1a and Q1c).  
Specifically, I address Q2 (causal effect of induced app adoptions) using the 
framework of Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE, Angrist et al. 1996, i.e. using 
a random assignment of the test group as an instrument for app adoptions).  
My experiment generates four main findings. First, both monetary incentives 
(T1) as well as information (T2) lead to a significant increase in customers’ mobile 
app adoptions, with a relative increase of 466% and 144%, respectively. Second, 
while providing monetary incentives leads to a larger increase in mobile app 
adoptions, such induced adoptions do not result in more purchases in the long run. In 
contrast, providing information leads to more effective mobile adoptions that 
sustainably increase customers’ purchases, even 12 months after adopting the app. 
Third, in examining customers’ multichannel purchase behaviors, I find that 
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information-induced adoptions (T2) lead to a complementarity in customers' 
purchases across the mobile app and the desktop channel, whereas incentive-induced 
adoptions lead to a substitution effect between mobile web and mobile web channel. 
Finally, I find that the information intervention (T2) can significantly increase overall 
profits of the firm (by 2-3%). In contrast, providing incentives (T1) does not lead to 
significant increase in overall profits.  
I then explore the underlying drivers of the differences between the effect of app 
adoption induced by different interventions (Q4(a)), using a new field experiment and 
a series of analysis. I uncover evidence that indicates that the observed long-run 
differences in customers’ behaviors across the two treatment groups are attributable 
to ‘sorting’. As expected, I find evidence of sorting in customers’ observable 
characteristics and behaviors, as well as in moderating effects. However, 
interestingly, after controlling for customers’ observable characteristics in LATE, the 
causal effect of induced adoptions for both treatments remains qualitatively the same, 
indicating that the effect of induced adoptions is largely attributable to sorting on 
characteristics unobservable by the firm. These findings are surprising and 
managerially important. They imply that customers possess private information about 
their “type” (i.e., their need for the mobile app) that firms are unable to observe. 
Therefore, firms can only rely on appropriate interventions to encourage sorting, i.e. 
attracting those customers who would use the mobile app effectively to adopt it.  
In summary, my study is among the first to investigate how firms can induce 
effective app adoptions. The findings of the study provide guidelines for designing 
interventions to motivate effective app adoptions, and add to our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying the effect of induced app adoption (i.e. sorting). The rest of 
the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 and 3 briefly discuss related literature and 
theoretical grounding. Section 4, 5 and 6 introduces the experiment design, empirical 
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strategy and data. I present the results in section 7 and discuss managerial 
implications in section 8. 
2.2 Prior Literature 
There is a growing literature on the role of mobile devices in influencing customers’ 
engagement and purchase behaviors (Jung et al. 2014, Xu et al. 2014, Xu et al. 2016). 
My study is closely related to three streams of research that spans information 
systems and marketing, among others. 
The first and most relevant stream of literature is one that focuses on the 
causal effects of mobile app adoptions on customers’ engagement and purchase 
behaviors. Using propensity score matching, difference-in-difference and other 
methods on observational data, previous studies have found that customers’ adoption 
of mobile apps can lead to more purchases (Xu et al. 2016), more social engagement 
(Jung et al. 2014), more consumption of news (Xu et al. 2014) and higher demand for 
digital service (Liu et al. 2016). However, from the firms’ perspective, a natural 
question is whether they can actively influence customers to adopt mobile apps, and 
whether such induced adoptions can increase customers’ purchases and firms’ profits 
in the long run. My study contributes to this research stream in two ways. First, 
previous studies focus on observed adoptions (Xu et al. 2016, Jung et al. 2014). My 
study complements these by focusing on the causal effects of induced app adoptions 
on customers’ purchase behaviors. As noted earlier, induced adopters may differ from 
organic adopters in fundamental ways in mobile app usage. Since marketers can only 
actively influence induced adoptions, it is crucial to understand the causal effects of 
induced adoptions on customer behaviors and business outcomes. My nuanced results 
also provide practical guidelines for firms designing interventions to motivate 
effective mobile adoptions2. Second, my study extends previous research by designing 
                                                
2 In China, a huge amount of venture capital funding has gone towards subsidies for mobile 
app adoptions. Such subsidy in general leads to poor returns, because of low customer 
engagement in the long run  
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a new identification strategy. Specifically, the usage of a randomized field experiment 
allows us to cleanly identify the effect of different interventions in driving mobile app 
adoption (Q1) and customer profitability (Q3). The combination of a randomized 
experiment with an instrumental variable approach (LATE) allows me to cleanly 
identify the causal effect of induced adoptions on customers’ purchase behaviors (Q2, 
see details in Section 3).  
The second important stream of research relates to factors that drive 
technology adoption (Hann et al. 2016, Dupas 2014), especially mobile app adoption 
(Bang et al. 2013, Ghose and Han 2014, Han et al. 2016, Zheng et al. 2016), as well 
as subsequent usage after adoption (Retana et al. 2016, Son et al. 2016, Kato-Lin et 
al. 2015). While previous studies investigate the two outcomes separately, I highlight 
a central tradeoff between adoption and effective usage in the context of mobile apps. 
My study is among the first to identify the causal effect of external interventions on 
the two outcomes at the same time.  The results imply that firms should use 
information-related interventions to strike a balance between motivating more 
adoptions (coverage) and ensuring effectiveness of those adoptions (sorting). 
Finally, my study also complements the stream of literature on the role of 
mobile apps in influencing customers’ purchase behaviors across multiple channels. 
Recent studies have demonstrated strong interdependence between different channels, 
in the form of substitution or complementarity (Brynjolfsson et al. 2009, Forman 
2009). The interdependence has also been confirmed in the context of mobile 
commerce (Xu et al. 2016) and digital banking (Liu et al. 2016). A recent study using 
clickstream data (De Haan et al. 2015) hypothesized that mobile and alternative 
channels may be used separately to fulfill different flows (e.g. information vs. 
transaction) in a customer’s online journey. My study complements this stream of 
literature with new evidence on the substitution/complementarity effects between 
mobile apps and alternate channels. My analyses also provide new insights that such 
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channel complementarity and substitution may be closely related to how customers 
are induced to adopt the app (i.e. sorting). 
2.3 Theoretical Grounding 
The effects of monetary incentives and information on customers’ purchase behaviors 
in the short run and long run (Figure 1a) have been studied in marketing (Ailawadi 
and Neslin 1998, Deighton et al. 1994) and economics (Nelson 1974, Dupas 2014).  
In addition, a recent stream of literature has investigated how the use of monetary and 
non-monetary interventions for customer acquisition may affect customers’ long-term 
value (Figure 1b, Lewis 2007). A differentiating feature of my study is that rather 
than directly influencing customers’ purchase behaviors, incentive or information is 
used to induce customers to sort (or self-select) into app adoption, and only such 
induced adoptions influence customers’ purchase behaviors in the long run (Figure 
1c). To the best of my knowledge, no study has investigated the mechanism 
underlying how incentive or information may influence customers’ purchases in the 
long run through induced adoptions.  
‘Sorting’ has its origins in information economics (Stiglitz 1975, Lazear 
2000), and refers to the fact that individuals (job applicants, patients, customers) 
could choose certain arrangements (e.g. labor contract, health insurance, technology 
adoption) based on their observable attributes and unobservable preferences or 
information. In my context, customers could have private information on their 
potential benefits from using the app. Customers who are induced by information to 
adopt the app could be different from customers induced by monetary incentive in 
both their observed characteristics (e.g. demographics and past behaviors) as well as 
unobservable need (e.g. deal discovery). Such observed and unobserved differences 
would then explain the differential effect of incentive-induced and information-
induced adoptions on customers’ purchase behaviors. 
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Specifically, previous literature on technology adoption has demonstrated that 
the provision of incentives may act as a double-edge sword: on the one hand, 
providing incentives may encourage more trials (Cohen and Dupas 2010), and 
facilitate habit formation (Charness and Gneezy 2009) thus increasing the effect of 
technology adoption; on the other hand, the use of short-run incentives may 
encourage adverse selection -- attracting those who will not use or do not need the 
technology (Ashraf et al. 2010), thus countering the effects of adoption in the long 
run. Such trade-off is especially salient in the case of mobile app adoptions. On the 
one hand, a mobile app is fundamentally an experience good; providing incentives 
may help customers overcome the fixed cost of downloading app, setting up 
payments, and learning. On the other hand, continuous use, rather than one-time 
adoption, of the app is required to drive purchases and contribute to the firm’s overall 
profitability; providing incentives may attract customers who only enjoy short-run 
benefits and not use the app in the long run (adverse selection).  
In contrast, highlighting the benefits of the mobile app may attract the right 
type of customers (whose needs for information are aligned with the benefits from 
using the app), and thus may lead to effective adoptions: information-induced 
adopters are likely to use the app more and in a more effective way, thereby 
benefiting more from their adoption. Such differences exist from the time of adoption 
and would lead to different usage patterns and purchase behaviors in the long run.  
In summary, there are two types of sorting: sorting on observables and sorting 
on unobservables. Both processes may be at work at the same time. For instance, 
providing monetary incentives (T1) may attract those customers who are more 
sensitive to incentives; and such adoption might only lead to short-run increase on 
customers’ purchases in first few weeks.  On the other hand, app adoptions induced 
by information (T2) could attract customers who download mobile app for its own 
value (such private value cannot be predicted by the firm using observables) – thus 
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those induced adopters are more likely to use the mobile app more in the long run, 
discover more deals and make more purchases (and on a wider range of deal 
categories). This leads to several testable implications. The first two implications are 
related to observable characteristics while the latter three are related to unobserved 
needs for the app. 
1) Adopters in the different treatment groups differ in their observable characteristics;  
2) Adopters in T1 (incentive) are more likely to make purchases through mobile app 
in the short run but the effect disappears in the long run (e.g. after few weeks);  
3) After controlling for all difference in observable characteristics, the causal effect of 
induced adoptions by both treatments still follows similar pattern, indicating sorting 
on unobservable.  
4) Information-induced adopters (T2) are likely to use the app more and discover 
more deals, which may lead to a greater variety of deals purchased, as well as more 
purchases in regions with higher deal densities.  
5) Information intervention (T2) does not directly affect customers’ purchases in the 
long run. (It only works by attracting the right type of adopters with strong need for 
app, i.e. sorting) 
In summary, I theorize that the effect of induced app adoptions may crucially depend 
on how customers are induced, because of sorting. Incentive and information may 
attract adopters with different observed and unobserved characteristics, which would 
then result in differential effects of induced adoptions. I test the implications and 
further discuss sorting3 in Section 7.  
                                                
3 It is important to clarify that the “sorting mechanism” discussed in this paper is different 
from “self-selection” in previous studies. There are two key differences. First, in previous 
observational studies, self-selection, which indicates customers who are more likely to make 
purchases have a higher propensity to adopt the app, may bias the identification of the causal 
effect of app adoptions. However, in my case, the treatment effect of induced adoptions is 
perfectly identified using the exogenous interventions in the experiment.  The “sorting effect” 
simply implies that the identified treatment effects may vary for adopters induced by different 




2.4 Experiment Design 
In collaboration with a leading daily deal-sharing platform in US, I conduct a large-
scale randomized field experiment to understand how to motivate effective mobile 
app adoptions. The platform offers a wide range of daily deals for local services and 
standard products at a high discount and has a large customer base. Users can use 
three channels (desktop, mobile web and mobile app) to browse and purchase deals 
on the platform. The platform offers a mobile app to its customers. However, at the 
time of my experiment, only a small portion of the customers had downloaded the 
mobile app, though a much larger portion of customers has accessed the platform’s 
email using their mobile device. The platform observes the customers’ mobile device 
type, app adoption status, and can target them with information or incentives through 
email. 
My experiment focuses on customers who a) have already accessed emails of 
the platform using an iPhone but have never downloaded its mobile app, and b) have 
made at least one purchase before experiment4. In practice, such customers are the 
target audience of mobile app adoption campaigns (DigiDay 2016). I randomly select 
over 230,000 eligible customers from the platform’s database, and randomly assign 
them into one of three experimental treatments: (i) Control group with no information 
or incentives (137,195 subjects); (ii) Treatment T1 with email highlighting an 
incentive ($5 deal bucks) for app adoption (48,027 subjects), and (iii) Treatment T2 
with email highlighting information about the ease of discovering deals using the app, 
                                                                                                                                      
related to their purchase behaviors (Y), “sorting” implies that customers may make adoption 
decisions based on the potential private benefits of app usage (ΔY). 
4 I focus on active users who have made at least one purchase, for the following reasons. 
First, firms often target active users in their mobile campaigns as they may purchase more 
upon adoption (DigiDay 2016). This is especially true when firms have a large number of 
active users (as in my case). Second, the response rate is usually very low for app download 
campaigns. To have enough power to identify the causal effect of induced adoptions, I focus 
on active users who usually have a higher response rate.  
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but does not contain any incentive for app adoption (48,070 subjects). The template is 
provided in the Figure 3. The sample size of both treatment groups is smaller than the 
control group because of the relatively large costs involved in sending out emails and 
incentives.  
The emails to the 96,097 customers in T1 and T2 are sent out in a single day 
at the same time.  The large scale campaign allows us to create a large and exogenous 
shock in the number of induced adoptions within a very short period (i.e. within few 
days, as discussed in section 6). Customers in the treatment groups receive the email 
only once during the test period, and can click a link to download the app. Customers 
in T1 are informed that they will automatically get $5 deal-bucks after they download 
and log in to the mobile app. The email for T1 also states that 1) the offer to get the 
deal bucks will expire in a week; 2) the deal bucks can be used in deal purchase and 
would expire in two weeks upon assignment. I also designed other aspects of the 
experiment very carefully. First, I strictly control spillovers across different test 
groups. Specifically, all the promotion/information is provided only through the email 
channel; thus customers cannot participate in the campaign through alternative 
channels. In addition, the $5 incentive is automatically tied to account ID of the 
customers in T1; thus other customers outside T1 are not eligible for the promotion. 
Second, once customers in different groups adopt the app (C, T1, T2), they will have 
exactly the same experience and receive the same information in their mobile app. 
This ensures that any difference in their future behaviors can be attributed to how 
they are induced to adopt the app in the first place. The interventions used in the field 
experiment are common industry practice and used by other ecommerce platforms in 
their email campaigns. For instance, major retailers such as Amazon, Groupon and 
LivingSocial have offered monetary incentive ($5 or $10 credit) for mobile app 
adoptions in historical campaigns, and have also promoted apps regularly using 
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informational email (Dedman 2011, Techcrunch 2015b). Thus, the external validity 
of my interventions is assured and my findings may be generalizable to other settings. 
2.5 Identification Strategy 
With the field experiment, I seek to understand three types of causal effects: (a) the 
effect of the two treatments (T1: incentive and T2: information) on customers’ app 
adoption decisions (Q1a); (b) the differential effect of incentive- and information-
induced adoptions on customers’ purchase behaviors (Local Average Treatment 
Effect, or LATE); (c) the effect of the two treatments on overall profitability (Q1c, 
intention-to-treat effect or ITT). The relationship between the three types of causal 
effects (‘Adoption’, ‘LATE’, ‘ITT’) is illustrated in Figure 2. They correspond to 
questions Q1a-Q1c highlighted earlier. Specifically, I answer Q1a and Q1c through 
direct comparisons between test groups, and address Q1b using the framework of 
(Imbens and Angrist 1994) (i.e. using the random assignment of test group as an 
instrument for the effect of induced adoptions). A main advantage of the intention-to-
treat (ITT) analysis in my study is that the findings can be directly applied to similar 
contexts because the interventions used in the field experiment are standard industry 
practice. The identification of causal effects in Q1a and Q1c is straightforward, with 
specifications in Equation (2) and Equation (3) in Section 7; therefore I focus my 
discussions on the motivation and intuition behind the LATE approach in identifying 
the causal effect of induced app adoptions (Q1b). 
An interesting aspect of motivating mobile app adoption is that only a small 
portion of users would ever be induced to adopt the mobile app5. However, these are 
exactly the users that firms can influence through external interventions. Thus, 
identifying the causal effect of mobile app adoptions on purchase behaviors for this 
population of induced adopters is important for firms. As discussed in the 
                                                
5 This is true for both campaigns across different ecommerce platforms (i.e. as revealed from low 




introduction, it is challenging to use observational data to identify the causal effect of 
induced app adoptions: first, using observational data, one cannot differentiate the 
induced adoptions from organic adoptions, and furthermore, one cannot differentiate 
different types of induced adoptions6; second, the identification strategy used in recent 
observational studies (e.g. matching, difference-in-difference) is based on the 
assumption that all endogeneity can be controlled by observables. However, this is 
unlikely in my case. As discussed later, I find evidence of sorting on unobservable, 
i.e. customers have private information about their future need of the app and such 
information cannot be explained by observables. To address both of these challenges, 
I conduct a field experiment and use interventions to exogenously create variations in 
induced adoption, and identify the causal effect of induced adoption using LATE. The 
randomized experiment, with external interventions randomly assigned over control 
and treatment groups, creates two unique features that are missing in the 
observational data: 1) a control group where only organic adoptions happen and 2) an 
exogenous and large shock to generate variation in the induced adoptions. The control 
group serves as a counterfactual (with only organic adoption) and helps us isolate the 
additional induced adoptions in treatment groups. The exogenous variation in induced 
adoptions ensures that its effect on customers’ purchases is causal.  
LATE: I explain the intuition of Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) 
using Figure 2. In all three test groups (C, T1, T2), a portion of the customers would 
                                                
6 I want to highlight that beyond incentive- and information-induced adoptions, there are potentially 
other types of induced adoption, such as firm-created word-of-mouth. However, the existence of WOM 
or other non-experimental induced adoptions would be taken care of by the random assignment in my 
experiment. The blue square in figure 2 may include both adopters from uncontrolled factors (e.g. 
WOM), but they are equally distributed across test groups. My experiment is not designed to identify 
the exact source of each adoption at the individual customer level. Rather, the randomized experiment 
assures that any organic or non-experiment induced adoptions are equally distributed across groups at 
an aggregate level. Therefore I can directly attribute the differences in customers’ app adoptions and 
the purchase behaviors to the different treatments. Such comparison allows us to cleanly identify the 
differential effect of treatments tested in the experiment (incentive- vs. information- intervention), 
without the need to overcome attribution challenges and understand the source of each adoption (e.g., 
WOM, delayed effects or other uncontrolled factors). 
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adopt the app organically. They are denoted as “always-takers” in the LATE 
framework (Athey and Imbens 2017) and are represented by the solid squares. In 
addition, some customers in the two treatment groups may be induced to adopt the 
mobile app after exposure to the interventions. The adoption decision is contingent on 
the specific intervention used by the firm and customers’ own information about their 
need for the app. Such induced adopters are called “compliers” in LATE framework, 
and are represented by dotted square (for incentive-induced adopters) and dashed 
square (for information-induced adopters). LATE can causally identify the treatment 
effect on (different types of) compliers, based on the following logic. First, the 
experiment incorporates a control group with no intervention, and thus provides a 
perfect counterfactual. I can observe what would happen if users had not received any 
interventions (control in Figure 2). Therefore, I can isolate the compliers at an 
aggregate level by comparing the adoption decision of customers in the control group 
with those in each treatment (dotted square for compliers in T1 and dashed area for 
compliers in T2). Second, for compliers in each treatment, I can separately identify 
the effect of induced app adoptions on their future purchase behaviors. Technically, I 
run a two-stage least square regression using test group assignment as the 
instrumental variable (see Equation 1, Wooldridge 2010, Imbens and Angrist 1994). 
Since the intervention is randomly assigned, the identified effect is not correlated 
with any confounding factors (e.g. endogenous targeting) and thus causality is 
assured (Adomavicius et al. 2013, Chen et al. 2017, Cui et al. 2016, Qiu and Kumar 
2017, Zhang and Zhu 2011).  
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑! = ∑𝛼! ∗ 𝑇!" + 𝜀! 
                               𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒! = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑! + 𝜎!                     (1) 
I want to highlight that the characteristics of compliers might be different 
from those of the average users on the platform. However, it is important to 
remember that 1) the identification of the treatment effect on those users is perfect 
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because of the control group and exogenous interventions7; and 2) those users are 
exactly the population of interest, as firms can only actively induce / influence those 
users for app adoption using interventions. In contrast, the average users are hardly 
the (influence-able) adopters.  Therefore, the causal effect identified by LATE for this 
population of compliers (dotted area or dashed area) are exactly what firms wish to 
know. The LATE approach offers two benefits: the causal effect identified by LATE 
is 1) specific to the compliers (the population of interest); 2) contingent on the 
instrument/intervention the firm uses (Athey and Imbens 2017). Thus firms can 
compare the effect of adoptions induced by different types of interventions. 
The identification of local average treatment effect (LATE) is based on two 
key assumptions. The first is monotonicity (Imbens and Angrist 1994), which 
requires the probability of app adoption is increasing when a user is treated 
(Adoption(treated) > Adoption(control)). This assumption is satisfied in my context 
as my email campaign provides more information or incentive for app adoption. The 
second assumption is the exclusion restriction, which requires there is no direct effect 
of the treatment (receiving email with information or incentive about mobile app) on 
the outcome (e.g. purchase behaviors), without being mediated by the mobile app 
adoption. In other words, all changes in future purchase behaviors should be driven 
by the difference in mobile app adoptions. In my context, the information treatment 
(T2) is one-time only and only mentions the benefits of the app (rather than 
encouraging purchases). Thus it satisfies the exclusion restriction. The incentive 
treatment (T1) provides a monetary incentive for app adoption (i.e. $5 deal bucks) but 
the incentives expire within two weeks of assignment. Thus I would expect a short-
run increase in customers’ purchases in T1 due to the effect of the incentives within 
                                                
7 Again, I want to emphasize that the identification is perfect in my case and there is no 
confounding problem as in most observational studies. Please see Imbens and Angrist 1994 
and Athey and Imbens 2017 for more details. The treatment effect may vary based on the 
interventions used to induce adoption. I term this difference as “sorting”. 
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the first 3 weeks (i.e. 1 week to claim the offer and 2 weeks to use deal bucks before 
expiration). However, firms are interested in the long-term effects of induced app 
adoptions beyond this short window, for both T1 and T2. Therefore, I exclude all the 
purchases within the first 3 weeks after the experiment for all test groups when 
estimating LATE. In this way, I can ensure my interventions do not directly affect the 
dependent variable in the second stage (purchase behaviors). Thus, the exclusion 
restriction is satisfied. Any effect on customers’ purchase behaviors in the long run (6 
or 12 months) can be attributed back to the differences in induced app adoptions.  
2.6 Research Context and Data 
I collaborate with a leading daily deal platform in the US and conduct a large scale 
randomized field experiment to examine how the firms can actively influence 
customers’ adoption of mobile apps, and whether such induced adoptions can lead to 
an increase in customers’ purchases. The collaborating platform offer a wide range of 
deals on local services and standard products, including restaurants, entertainment, 
outdoor activities, home service, retailing products, fitness activities, travel, beauty 
and health service. The vast majority of deals on the platform are local deals. 
Depending on the location (e.g. big vs. small cities), the inventory of deals per city 
may vary between a few and a few hundred deals. Customers need to incur a search 
cost when looking through daily deals, especially in those cities with a large 
inventory. 
The randomized field experiment was run on the platform for one day and I 
am able to collect information for the entire sample of more than 230,000 unique 
customers over a long period after the experiment. For every customer, I record 
information including the unique hashed identifier of the customers, the assigned test 
group, the mobile app adoption status (and adoption time), and all purchases before 
and after the experiment. For each purchase, I record detailed information including 
the purchased deal, the revenue/discount from the purchase, as well as the purchase 
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channel (mobile web, desktop). I further augment the purchase dataset with rich deal 
characteristics (price, category, location, merchant). The resulting dataset enables us 
to analyze the effect of different interventions at an aggregate level as well as at a 
more granular level.  
2.7 Results and Discussion 
I first check the validity of my randomization. In Table 1 I provide the breakdown of 
major covariates in the three groups. As shown in the results, there are no significant 
differences across the groups on all the covariates (number of past purchases in total 
and across channels, number of units per purchase, number of purchased categories, 
average price of purchased deals, total revenue, customer tenure). The well-balanced 
sample indicates that my randomization is at work.  
2.7.1 Q1a: The effects on app adoptions  
I examine the effect of incentive (T1) or information (T2) in motivating mobile app 
adoption by estimating a Linear Probability Model (LPM) on the full sample, as 
shown in equation (2). A similar strategy is widely used in field experiment studies, 
as illustrated in Duflo et al. (2008). The results are robust under alternative models 
such as Logit and Probit (Table A2). 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑! = ∑𝛼! ∗ 𝑇!" + 𝜀!          (2) 
Downloadi is a dummy variable indicating whether the customer i has 
downloaded the mobile app within a certain time frame. Since customers can respond 
any time after receiving the email, I examine the results using different time frames to 
understand how the effect changes over time (e.g. 1 day, 3 days, 1 week and 2 weeks 
after the experiment). 𝑇!" is the dummy variable of test group k that the customer i is 
randomly assigned to.  
The results are presented in Table 2. Both incentive (T1) and information (T2) 
lead to a significant increase in customers’ mobile app adoptions, and such effects are 
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consistent across different time frames (1day, 3day, 1week, 2week)8. The magnitude 
of increase is economically significant: providing incentives can lead to an 466% 
increase in app downloads over that in control group; while providing information 
leads to an 144% increase over control group (based on downloads within 3 days).  
The stronger effect of monetary incentive (T1) on technology adoption is aligned with 
previous findings (Dupas 2014). In addition, consistent with the temporary nature of 
email communication, there is a large increase in mobile app adoption in both T1 and 
T2 on the first day, and the differences in app adoption (T1-C and T2-C) becomes 
stable within a week after the intervention (Table 2). 
In summary, my results show that firms can effectively motivate customers to 
adopt mobile apps using external interventions, with monetary incentive leading to 
significantly more adoptions than pure information. The key question then is whether 
such app adoptions induced by external interventions can lead to a significant 
increase in customers’ purchase behaviors, and whether incentive-induced adoption is 
more effective than information-induced adoption. 
2.7.2 Q1b: The causal effect of induced app adoptions on long-term 
purchases  
I am particularly interested in the causal effect of induced mobile adoptions, rather 
than organic adoptions, on customers’ purchase behaviors, because firms can active 
influence the level of induced adoption by providing incentives or information. As 
discussed in Section 5, I adopt the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) 
framework (Angrist et al. 1996, Imbens and Angrist 1994) to identify the causal 
effect of induced adoptions. As described in the Empirical Strategy section, the causal 
effect of induced adoptions is identified by LATE wherein the exogenous treatment 
assignment serves as the instrument variable to isolate the induced adoptions from 
                                                
8 The effect of incentive and information on app adoption is also consistent and stable in the long run, 
for instance using alternative time windows (1, 3, 6, 9, 12months).  
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organic adoptions. As discussed above, the effect of both incentives and information 
on app downloads become stable after one week. Thus, I use the download within the 
first week after the experiment as my outcome variable in Stage 1 and the instrument 
in Stage 2. I choose the time frame to include as many induced adoptions as possible 
and also to exclude organic adoptions to maintain the power in second stage 
estimation9. To examine the long-term effects of induced app adoptions on customers’ 
purchase behaviors, I examine their purchases in two time frames after the 
experiment -- within 6 months and within 12 months. Following discussions in 
Empirical Strategy section and consistent with my focus on behavior changes in the 
long run, I exclude all purchases within the first 3 weeks when constructing the 
purchase outcome (the results for purchases within first 3 weeks are separately 
presented in Table 6). The results are robust when I exclude purchases in alternative 
time windows: first 3 months and first 6 months (Table A1). 
I present the results from LATE in Table 3. Interestingly, I find the only app 
adoptions induced by information (T2) lead to a significant increase in customers’ 
purchases in the long run. In contrast, app adoptions induced by incentive (T1) have 
no causal impact on customers’ purchase behaviors. The results suggest that the effect 
of mobile app adoptions heavily depends on how customers are induced to adopt the 
app in the first place. Though monetary incentives (T1) are effective in driving people 
to adopt the app, such recruitment approach does not lead to more purchases from 
customers after they download the app. In contrast, providing information leads to a 
smaller increase in app adoptions but such adoptions lead a sustainable increase in 
customers’ purchases in the long term. These findings show the nuanced tradeoffs 
between motivating mobile app adoption and appropriating value from such adoption, 
and provide guidelines to firms on how to encourage effective app adoptions. 
                                                
9 I also estimated LATE using alternative instruments, i.e. download behavior of 3 days, 2 weeks and 3 
weeks. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results using download behavior 
of 1 week. 
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2.7.3 Q1c: The impact of incentive vs. information on overall profitability 
I run an OLS model on the full sample to examine the effect of two interventions on 
customer profitability (i.e. number of total purchases as well as net profits) using 
equation 3.  
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒! = ∑𝛾! ∗ 𝑇!" + 𝜖!        (3) 
Purchasei is the number of purchases within a time frame for customer i. I use 
customers’ purchases within 6 months and 12 months after the interventions 
(including the first three weeks) as the outcome measure to investigate long-term 
effect of my interventions on customer profitability. The results are displayed in 
Table 4. Consistent with the findings on the causal effect of induced adoption 
(LATE), I find providing information (T2) has a positive and significant effect on 
customers’ purchases (Table 4) and net profits (Table A3) across different time 
frames (but does not increase product returns as shown in Narang and Shankar 2016, 
see Table A13). Such increase is about 2-3% of net profits from all customers in the 
treatment group (T2) and amounts to hundreds of thousands of dollars if the 
information intervention is scaled up to target all active users on the platform. In 
contrast, providing incentives does not lead to any significant increase in customer 
profitability, as measured by both total purchases (Table 4) and net profits (Table 
A3). After taking into account the cost of incentives for adopters, the firm may lose a 
good amount of investment on average on each customer in the treatment group. 
Overall, my results suggest that providing information may increase customer 
profitability while monetary incentives may not, though the latter may lead to more 
app adoptions. Given the lower cost of providing information compared to monetary 
incentives, my findings indicate that managers should use information provisioning as 
the main mechanism to encourage mobile app adopters with aligned need. 
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2.7.4 Q2: Multi-channel purchase behaviors 
Although the previous analyses consistently support a positive effect of information-
induced adoptions and reveal the underlying driver of the difference between the 
effects of information- vs. incentive-induced adoption, they do not shed light on the 
process underlying the treatment effect. In the rest of this section, I delve into the 
process and explore how app adoption affects customers’ online shopping behavior 
across channels. 
I first investigate the channel interdependencies for different types of induced 
adoptions, by decomposing customers’ purchases into different channels. There are 
three channels that customers can use to browse products and make purchases – 
desktop (PC), mobile web and mobile app. The mobile web channel provides a 
smaller and customized view of the desktop website to fit the mobile screen. Mobile 
app offers the same set of products as the desktop and the mobile web but presents 
them in a way that is more convenient for mobile browsing and search. 
My objective here is to understand the causal effect of induced mobile app 
adoptions on customers’ purchases through these different channels. I follow the 
same empirical approach discussed in Q2 by changing my dependent variable to 
customer’s purchases within each channel, i.e. Desktop_Purch for desktop purchases, 
MobileApp_Purch for mobile app purchases and MobileWeb_Purch for mobile web 
purchases. I use the LATE approach and leverage exogenous treatment assignment as 
the instrument variable for my identification. The results are presented in Table 8. 
Recalling my results on overall purchases, induced adoptions by information (T2) 
lead to a positive and significant effect on customers’ purchases while those by 
incentive (T1) do not. In examining the results of the analysis of data broken down by 
channels, I find that adoption induced by monetary incentives (T1) has a significant 
negative impact on mobile web purchases while it has a positive impact on mobile 
app purchases (not statistically significant). The two channels substitute each other, 
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resulting in a non-significant net effect. In contrast, app adoptions induced by 
information (T2) have a positive and significant impact on purchases through the 
desktop channel. This indicates that the desktop and mobile app channels are 
complementary to each other for information-induced adopters (T2). Such 
complementarity is aligned with findings in previous literature (Xu et al. 2016, De 
Haan et al. 2015). The above results indicate that the incentive-induced adopters 
merely shift their purchases from the mobile web to the mobile app channel (as the 
latter offers a better shopping experience on the same device), but do not significantly 
change their total purchases; whereas the information-induced adopters still use the 
desktop intensively, but add mobile app as a complementary channel for deal 
discovery in their online shopping process. This is consistent with recent observations 
in the industry: For instance, citing various reports, Forbe (2017) suggested 
“…retailers need to be aware that the customer journey is not simple. Many will view 
items on their mobile devices but only purchase on their desktop or laptop 
computers.”  
2.7.5 Q3: Underlying Mechanisms 
As discussed in the Theoretical Grounding section (section 5), the differential impact 
of incentive-and information-induced adoption on customers’ purchase behaviors is 
potentially driven by sorting, i.e. those information-induced adopters are different 
from those incentive-induced adopters in their observable characteristics and 
unobserved need (Figure 3). I now empirically test the derived implications in section 
3 related to sorting on observable and unobservable: 
First, I indeed find adopters are different in their observable characteristics 
(Table 5): the information-induced adopters, who benefit more from app adoption, 
make fewer purchases before the experiment, but on average, purchase more 
expensive deals. In addition, I also find that the incentive treatment (T1) increases 
customers’ purchases in the short run (e.g. first 3 weeks) in the mobile app channel 
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(Table 6), but the effect disappears after the first 3 weeks.  The evidence is aligned 
with the explanation that monetary incentive may attract users who do not value the 
mobile app as much, but are more interested in the monetary incentive.  
Given the findings on the differences in observables for adopters across 
different groups I ask: could firms leverage customers’ observable characteristic to 
predict who would need the mobile app most (or will increase their purchases most 
from mobile adoption)? If yes (i.e. sorting on observable), then the firm can actively 
target those customers and encourage mobile app adoptions using monetary 
incentives (which would lead to a higher adoption rate). This would enable the firm to 
achieve both coverage and effectiveness in motivating app adoptions. If the answer is 
no (i.e. sorting on unobservable), then the firm would need to design an appropriate 
intervention (i.e. information provisioning) to encourage sorting, and may need to 
make a tradeoff between coverage and effectiveness in app adoption. I formally test 
whether sorting is purely based on observables by adding observable covariates in 
both stages (Imbens and Angrist 1994, Angrist et al. 1996). Interestingly, I find that 
after accounting for various observable characteristics, there is still a strong positive 
relationship between indicator of informational treatment (T2) and the treatment 
effect (Table 7: the magnitude of the causal effect is almost the same and highly 
significant). The results indicate a strong form of sorting -- sorting on unobservables 
– driving induced adoptions. In other words, customers possess private information 
about their needs or potential usage of the mobile app that is unobservable by the 
firm. Thus firms can only use certain intervention to attract the customers with a 
higher need to sort into adoption, therefore increases customers’ purchases in the long 
run. 
I further test implication 4 related to sorting on unobservable. If sorting is at 
work, providing information (T2) would attract customers who download the mobile 
app due to an unobserved need, and therefore use the app more often and discover 
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more deals. Consistent with increased app browsing as suggested by sorting, I find 
that those information-induced app adoptions are likely to lead to a larger variety of 
purchases in general (Table 9), Moreover, such induced adoptions are more likely to 
lead to a larger increase in customers’ purchases in cities with higher deal densities 
(Table 10), where customers may benefit more from app usage.  
Finally, my intervention (i.e. an information email) may affect the customers’ 
purchase behaviors in the long run through two mechanisms: sorting and treatment 
(or influence). The treatment mechanism indicates that information-induced adopters 
would be similar to organic adopters (i.e. no sorting). The differences in the outcomes 
are only driven by the fact that they have received the information (email), which 
may directly influence their purchase behavior in the long run. It is notoriously hard 
to rule out the treatment mechanism using observational data (Wooldridge 2010), as 
the same intervention (i.e. information email) may induce sorting and a treatment 
effect at the same time. I therefore design and implement an additional randomized 
experiment to rule out the treatment/influence explanation. i.e. whether the 
information treatment would have a direct impact on customers’ type and directly 
influence their behavior. To this end, I carefully choose over 2,700 users who have 
already adopted the mobile app (existing adopters), and randomly assign them into 
control and treatment group. All users in the treatment group would receive an 
information email about the app. Using existing app adopters as the experimental 
subjects allows me to turn off sorting and cleanly identify the effect of the 
information email (T2). I find that the effect of information treatment is not 
significant in driving customers’ purchase (Table 11). These findings confirm 
implication 5 and provide further support of sorting mechanism as the driver behind 
the differential effect of induced app adoptions on customer behaviors.  
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2.8 Conclusion and Future Directions 
In summary, my study is among the first to investigate how firms can actively 
influence customers’ adoption of mobile apps and increase customers’ purchases 
through induced app adoptions. My study confirms that firms may motivate effective 
app adoption and increase net profits, but only when using appropriate intervention. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom and common practice, I find providing incentive 
may induce negative sorting in mobile app adoption and does not lead to long-run 
increase in customers’ purchase and firm’s profitability. In contrast, information-
based intervention may attract the right group of customers who have strong need of 
the app and would use it effectively (i.e. positive sorting). By leveraging a carefully-
designed randomized field experiment, my study is among the first to show that the 
causal effect of induced app adoptions may critically depend on how customers are 
motivated. I further look into the underlying driver of such difference in the effect of 
induced adoption (i.e. sorting on unobservable), and examine how adopters induced 
by different interventions behave differently in their purchase behaviors across 
multiple channels. The nuanced findings of the study not only provide guidelines for 
designing interventions to motivate effective mobile app adoptions, but also add to 
our understanding of the role of mobile apps in changing customers’ online shopping 
behaviors.  
I believe there are a few interesting directions for future research:  First, my 
study demonstrates a fundamental tradeoff firms are facing when designing 
intervention to motivate app adoption: how to balance coverage (more adoption) and 
effectiveness (better adoption)? I show that offering incentives may boost coverage, 
but providing information, rather than incentives is what leads to effective adoptions. 
Ideally firms want to predict a subset of customers that would positively benefit from 
induced app adoption and target them with monetary incentive to enhance adoption. 
However, I find that the difference in treatment effects of induced adoptions cannot 
be fully predicted by observable characteristics. Thus firms may only rely on the 
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appropriate intervention to encourage sorting. However, to a certain extent, firms may 
still be able to identify certain customer segments that would benefit more from 
induced app adoption. For instance, I find that information-induced adoptions (T2) 
are more effective for customers who have only used the desktop channel in their past 
purchases (Table 12). Future research can extend my study by combining prediction 
with active intervention in targeting application (Li et al. 2015) to achieve better 
coverage and higher effectiveness of mobile app adoption.  
Second, in the current study, I keep in-app experience the same for adopters in 
three test groups and do not vary in-app intervention, as my goal is to identify the 
causal effect of induced app adoption (rather than in-app intervention) on customers’ 
purchases. My study demonstrates that it is important for firms to ‘get the right 
adoption’ at the beginning, as such adoption may lead to long-run increase in 
customer profitability. However, upon adoption, firms may also use in-app 
interventions to further engage customers (Son et al. 2016, Kato-Lin et al. 2015). 
Understanding the effect of in-app intervention, contingent on various types of 
adoption, is thus crucial. Future research may extend my study by examining different 
types of mobile interventions (Chen et al. 2017, Wang et al. 2016, Li et al. 2015, 
Zhang et al. 2016), after the technology adoption (Retana et al. 2017). Researchers 
may also investigate whether and how mobile interventions can be customized for 
different types of induced adopters (Ma et al. 2007, Ghose 2017). 
Third, my paper has focused on identifying the effect of app adoptions 
induced by two most commonly used interventions in mobile app campaigns: 
incentive and information (Techcrunch 2015a, Financial Times 2016). Future 
research may further investigate the effect of app adoptions induced by other types of 
interventions (e.g. firm-created word-of-mouth).  
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Chapter 3: Beauty and Signaling in Online Matching Markets: 
Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Online matching platforms have proliferated over the past decade, and a central 
challenge faced by these platforms is how to mitigate information asymmetry and 
facilitate matching among strangers. In response, online matching platforms have 
made significant investments in a variety of information mechanisms that seek to 
mitigate information asymmetry and increase overall credibility (Luo, 2002; Pavlou 
& Gefen, 2004; Urban et al., 2009). Among these mechanisms, phone verification of 
registrants is one of the most frequently used mechanisms to assure users are real and 
to avoid them changing identity via multiple accounts10. While mandatory verification 
is widely implemented in practice and well understood as an effective assurance for 
overall credibility and security, it is nevertheless, costly in terms of time and effort for 
participants, and thus requiring it for all participants can significantly impede the 
growth of the platform. More importantly, such mandatory verification may suppress 
useful information that is conveyed when users voluntarily choose to verify 
themselves. Taking these into account, in this study, I therefore seek to understand a 
different role of verification that has not been studied previously – its ability to serve 
as a credible signal for individual users, when such verification is made optional and 
visible to others.  
My study focuses on non-transactional markets and online platforms such as 
online dating markets that lack alternative information mechanisms, such as 
reputation and transaction-assurance mechanisms (e.g., online reviews, escrow 
services, and money-back guarantees). In addition, users on these platforms also have 
to rely on self-disclosed information by potential partners. In such contexts, providing 
                                                
10 Phone number verification is more secured than commonly used email verification. It becomes the 
preferred and equivalent way to verify user identity.  
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verified and credible information of one’s authenticity through the simple mechanism 
of phone verification takes on additional significance.  
Unlike previous studies of other information mechanisms that largely focus on their 
ex post effectiveness, my study also examines the ex ante choices of opting in to 
verification. My study is also unique as it focuses on a two-sided matching market 
wherein both sides have the choice of opting in to the same signal. Therefore, I am 
interested in the differential implications for the two sides of the platform as the value 
of verification could differ across user types as well as across the two sides of the 
platform. Moreover, I focus on the role of paid verification wherein the platform 
charges a fee for verifying users, given the potential benefits to verified users (Ba et 
al. 2003; Goes and Lin 2012)11. I compare it with free verification wherein there are 
no monetary costs for verification. More specifically, I ask: 
Q1. Verification Decisions: 
Q1a: Given the option to verify, who would choose to verify? How do the opt-in 
decisions differ across the two sides of the platform?  
Q1b: What is the underlying mechanism driving such decisions? 
Q2. Impact of Verification: 
Q2a: How does verification influence the potential partners of verified users?  
Q2b: How does verification impact verified users themselves? 
Q3. Verification Impact on the Platform: 
Q3a: How does verification affect matching between the two sides of the platform? 
Q3b: How does paid verification differ from free verification? 
To examine these questions, I collaborate with one of the leading online dating 
platforms in the US. I choose an online dating market in particular for four main 
                                                
11 Phone verification is a credible signal since it is costly for spammers and scammers to pass this 
verification. Many of them create fake accounts in batches and use bots for email verification and 
communication (Salge and Karahanna, 2018). Research also suggests that verified information can 
inspire trust (Vosough et al., 2018). 
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reasons. Firstly, online dating markets have gone mainstream and have gotten 
increasing attention from researchers and marketers. One in five new relationships 
and one in six new marriages begin online12. As a business, it is worth $2.5 billion 
annually in the US alone13. More importantly, online dating markets, different from 
most online transactional matching markets that have well-established reputation 
systems, have no alternative signals to mitigate information asymmetry. Further, 
almost all user information is self-disclosed. As noted earlier, optional verification 
could play a more strategic role for users under such circumstances. Thus, the online 
dating platform I collaborate with provides an ideal environment to study optional 
verification and its differential impacts on the two sides. Last but not least, while 
there have been studies in other types of online matching markets, empirical studies 
and particularly randomized field experiments in these markets have been very 
limited due to a number of concerns and limitations (Coles et al. 2010; Hitsch et al. 
2010).  
I design and conduct a randomized controlled field experiment to draw causal 
inference. Before I introduce optional phone verification to users in the online dating 
platform, no verifiable information has been asked for, or has been disclosed on this 
platform. I randomly assign existing users to one of the three groups: one control 
group, and two treatment groups. The treatment I (T1) is a one-time invitation for 
verifying the user’s account through their mobile phone with a charge of 50 virtual 
coins (equiv. $2) while treatment II (T2) is the same invitation but at no monetary 
cost. The invitation message reveals the visibility of verification to other users. After 
verification, these users get a badge prominently displayed on their profiles indicating 
                                                
12 Caitlin Stewart, The Dating Services Industry in 2016 and Beyond. 2016.  




the phone number is verified, which is visible to all users on the platform, including 
those in the control group. 
I follow the signaling and related theories to guide my empirical investigation 
on the ex ante opt-in decisions as well as the ex post verification impacts of optional 
verification. In examining the opt-in decisions (Q1a), I find that only 8% of the users 
choose to pay a fee to verify in T1 while 10% of the users choose to verify for free in 
T2. Sharing personal information is costly, and additional charges further increase the 
cost and result in lower opt-in rates. I am particularly interested in understanding how 
the two sides on this platform – males and females – make verification choices and 
how it further affects their outcomes. I segment females and males into three tiers 
respectively– Low (L), Medium (M) and High (H) types - based on their popularity 
on the platform. Very interestingly, I find only the male side aligns with the 
conventional prediction of signaling. Specifically, I find that males have a monotonic 
pattern of verification, with higher type males being more likely to opt-in to 
verification. However surprisingly, I see a non-monotonic pattern of verification for 
females, wherein M-type females are more likely to opt into verification relative to L- 
and H-type females. Such a non-monotonic pattern has also been documented in an 
emerging literature in signaling and voluntary quality disclosure in other contexts. For 
instance, top business schools are less likely to disclose their ranking than middle tier 
schools as they confidently rely on existing favorable information/signal (Luca and 
Smith, 2015). 
To understand this differential opt-in pattern among males and females (Q1b) 
within the same platform, I consider the working conditions for signaling - H-types 
would be more likely to adopt the new signal if it adds values to the existing signal 
(Riley, 2001; Spence, 1978; Spence, 2002). A new signal tends to be more valuable 
when the existing signal is less credible or less valuable (Boulding and Kirmani, 1993; 
Wells, et al., 2011). Following these theories, I examine the existing dominant signal 
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for each side in my context- income of males and beauty of females, as borne out by 
prior research (Abramitzky et al., 2011; Hitsch et al. 2010b). I apply state-of-the-art 
deep learning framework to measure beauty using the photos of females. Consistent 
with the aforementioned theories, I find supporting evidence suggesting that in my 
context the decision whether to opt-in to verification depends on how credible the 
existing signal is. Beauty among females, assessed through images, is a credible and 
easily verifiable attribute. Consequently, H-type females with high beauty scores have 
a lower incentive to verify, while M-type females are more likely to verify to 
differentiate themselves from L-type females. However, income among males, as a 
self-disclosed value, is noisy and not easily verifiable. In keeping with this I find that 
males, especially H-type males, find verification to be a valuable signal and are more 
likely to verify as compared to M-type and L-type males. 
In examining the outcomes of such verification on the potential partners of 
verified individuals (Q2a), I examine both the changes in the quantity of the messages 
received as well as the changes in quality (i.e., popularity) of the senders who initiate 
the messages. Consistent with rational ex ante opt-in decisions, verified users do 
benefit as they get more contacts from better users, and the tiers that are the most 
likely to verify (i.e., H-type males and M-type females) benefit the most. Moreover, 
interestingly, I find that upon verification the verified users become more proactive 
and are more likely to initiate messages to higher-quality potential partners (Q2b).  
Going beyond individual users, I examine the impact of verification on the 
platform as a whole and find that it facilitates matching between the two sides (Q3a). 
Matching platforms often seek to balance out the attention among superstars and 
average users and to promote high quality users when the market is crowded and 
competitive (Roth, 2015). With the introduction of this voluntary verification signal, 
M-type females are able to move closer to H-type females while H-type males 
manage to further stand out from the crowd. This, in turn, allows females to easily 
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identify these H-type males for desirable matching outcomes. Such improvement on 
matching quantity and quality result not only from the signaling effect of verification 
but also from increased pro-activeness among verified users. Further, I examine free 
verification and find that it has similar outcomes as paid verification, although the 
effects are weaker (Q3b). This highlights a trade-off between higher coverage of 
verification (free verification) and stronger signaling properties (paid verification). 
My study makes a number of useful theoretical and empirical contributions to 
previous literature. First and foremost, although prior studies have examined the role 
of verification and its impact on market outcomes, verification in these studies is 
within the context of a reputation mechanism (Anderson and Simester 2014; Forman 
et al. 2008; Mayzlin et al. 2014). On the other hand, I focus on a context where there 
are no alternative reputation or third-party signals that can mitigate information 
asymmetry. I examine whether and how optional verification can serve an effective 
signal for further differentiation under such circumstances. More importantly, it is not 
clear how people strategically choose to adopt this signal. While prior research has 
examined the effectiveness of information mechanisms such as WOM and third-party 
certificates (Antony et al., 2006; Buttner and Goritz, 2008; Pavlou & Gefen, 2004; 
Ubran, et al., 2009) in other contexts, there are hardly any studies that examine users’ 
adoption decisions of such mechanism. My study contributes to this literature on 
information mechanisms by examining both the user’s adoption decision as well as its 
impacts on user outcomes.      
Further, prior studies examining the role of information mechanisms have 
largely focused on one of the two sides in a platform (for e.g., the seller side; see, 
Ubran, et al., 2009; Anderson and Simester 2014), similar in the broader context of 
examining a signaling mechanism. However in a peer-to-peer platform where two 
sides can both adopt the same signal, such as online dating markets, the ex ante 
decisions to opt-in and the ex post benefits of verification may be different for the two 
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sides. My study adds to the large body of work in signaling by examining the 
differential choices and subsequently differential impacts of verification across the 
two sides of an online platform (Luca and Smith, 2015; Riley, 2001). Moreover, I 
contribute to emerging research on applying deep-learning techniques to business 
problems, by using deep learning to predict human beauty and examine how beauty 
impacts females’ adoption of verification (Malik et al., 2017).  
Finally, my study generates interesting implications for the design of 
verification mechanisms for online matching platforms. It provides insights on how 
optional verification can serve as an effective signaling device for the different users 
on a matching platform and benefit the overall platform by helping M-type females 
and H-type males stand out. It also provides guidelines for platform designers on the 
tradeoff between paid verification and free verification. These actionable insights can 
be particularly valuable for those platforms that have no other complementary 
reputation systems or are in the cold-start stage with no other established reputation 
mechanisms.  
3.2 Theoretical Motivation 
My work builds on and contributes to three streams of literature: The first is the 
information systems and economics literature on matching markets and related 
empirical studies on specific marriage markets across economics, information 
systems, sociology, social psychology and anthropology. The second is the 
information systems and economics literature on verification and information 
mechanisms, and the seminal economics literature on signaling. The third is the 
emerging literature on applications of deep learning to business problems.  
3.2.1 Matching and Marriage Markets 
Research on matching markets, particularly those relating to market design, focus on 
designing efficient/ stable matching mechanisms (Coles et al. 2010; Hitsch et al. 
2010; Roth 2015). Some examples include kidney transfer, matching of medical 
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interns to hospitals, matching of gastroenterologists to hospitals etc. However, online 
dating markets have not been studied with equal vigor despite their popularity and 
importance to society. Online dating markets, in particular, suffer from significant 
information asymmetries due to self-disclosed information with low credibility as 
well as no alternative information signals. This is among the first study to examine 
the role of optional verification in an online matching market. Moreover, I design and 
conduct a randomized field experiment, which is very limited in other matching 
markets due to regulation and other constraints.  
In particular, my study also draws upon prior research on specific matching 
markets for marriage and online dating. Most previous work on marriage markets has 
examined matching and sorting patterns (Bruch and Newman, 2018; Hitsch et al. 
2010a; Hitsch et al. 2010b; Abramitzky et al., 2011) and identified gender differences 
in sorting preferences. For instance, prior research (Histch et al., 2010a; Histch et al., 
2010b; Fisman et al., 2006) has shown that males place a higher value on physical 
appearance of females while females place a higher value on income of males. My 
study adds to existing research by showing how these differences are related to 
differential opt-in decisions for males and females. Finally, my findings also 
contribute to the growing research in Information systems on online dating markets. 
For instance, Bapna et al. conduct a controlled randomized field experiments to 
investigate how viewing a potential partner’s profile anonymously works as a weak 
signal of preference (2016). My study in comparison, examines another important 
signal in online dating markets – signals of willingness to share personal information, 
which further leads to the transmission of preference signals (e.g., profile views and 
messages). 
3.2.2 Signaling and Verification  
My study builds on earlier research relating to verification as a basic mechanism to 
reduce information asymmetry. Researchers have studied the effect of verification on 
 40 
 
a number of different outcomes (Anderson and Simester 2014; Forman et al. 2008; 
Mayzlin et al. 2014). For instance, verified reviews are found to have a greater impact 
on subsequent review behaviors and product sales (Forman et al. 2008). The impact 
of verification is mostly examined within the context of reputation system. However, 
I focus on a strategic role that optional verification may play in a market where there 
are no alternative information signals, e.g. WOM. Besides examining the 
effectiveness of verification, I am also interested in how users across the two sides 
strategically adopt this signal when it is made optional and visible to others. While 
previous studies (Berger and Rand 2008; Forman et al. 2008; Ma and Agarwal 2007) 
consider verification as a self-enforcing norm or conforming to a community, I find 
optional verification can serve as a strategic differentiator in matching markets 
lacking alternate signals.  
The opt-in decisions of verification as a signal stem from the seminal 
theoretical and empirical studies of signaling. Traditional signaling models suggest 
that higher types (high in productivity, wealth, or some other valued attribute) are 
more likely to send a costly signal to separate from lower types (Jovanovic, 1982; 
Riley, 2001; Spence, 1978; Spence, 2002). Following the intuition of signaling, 
however, there is emerging literature that suggests H-type users sometimes are less 
likely to signal comparing with M-type users (Feltovich et al., 2012; Gambetta and 
Székely, 2014; Luca and Smith, 2015). For example, in Luca and Smith’s study 
(2015), top business school are much less likely to disclose their ranking compared to 
middle-tier schools as middle-tier schools have more incentive to signal their type and 
differentiate from low-tier schools. This phenomenon could occur when H-type 
confidently rely on a favorable existing signal whereas the existing signal of M-type 
may not be a good enough differentiator. 
In general, the decision of adopting a new signal depends on the additional 
value of the new signal comparing to the exiting signal. Users resort to the new signal 
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when it is relatively more credible or adds new differentiation value as compared to 
the existing signal (Boulding and Kirmani, 1993; Wells, et al., 2011). H-type users 
may not adopt the new signal if the existing signal is sufficient. The emerging 
literature on the non-monotonic pattern largely focuses on theoretical models or lab 
experiments while my study provides novel evidence of such interesting pattern in an 
empirical setting. More importantly, my study provides novel evidence of such 
interesting patterns in an empirical setting. More importantly, while prior studies have 
provided evidence of either a monotonic pattern or a non-monotonic pattern in 
different contexts, my study is among the first that documents a heterogeneous 
pattern across two sides of the same market – wherein females and males strategically 
use the same signal differently. Moreover, existing studies focus only on the 
voluntary decisions of adopting the new signal (Luca and Smith, 2015). My study is 
among the first that also examines and validates the ex post benefit of adopting the 
signal through a well-designed controlled field experiment. 
 Finally, there is an increasing attention to compare voluntary and mandatory 
mechanisms in the literature of quality disclosure. Recent studies have identified the 
role of voluntary mechanisms as a signaling device in other contexts. For instance, 
the firms that choose to audit, when auditing is no longer legally required, attract 
upgrades to their credit ratings as such voluntary auditing sends a positive signal of 
low risk to the public (Lennox and Pittman, 2011). My study contributes to this thread 
of literature by examining the role of optional verification in its ability to serve as a 
credible signal for individual users in a matching market, particularly when there no 
alternative assurance mechanisms and users have to rely on self-disclosed information. 
3.2.3 Deep Learning in Business 
I adopt state-of-the-art deep learning techniques to construct beauty of females using 
their photos. Deep neural networks have been applied to various image-related tasks, 
such as image classification and face recognition, due to the superior ability to learn 
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discriminative features (Krzhevsky et al., 2012; Taigman et al., 2014). There is 
emerging research that uses deep learning to predict beauty. Most papers in computer 
science seek to develop better algorithms (Liang et al., 2018; Xu, et al., 2018). 
Meanwhile, researchers in business and social science have also begun to value this 
technique’s high scalability and consistency to mine values from pictures (Malik et 
al., 2017; Liu, et al., 2016). For instance, one study used it to examine bias in career 
development (Malik et al., 2017). I contribute to this emerging line of work by 
applying a state-of-the-art deep learning architecture to extract beauty of female users 
in my samples, and examine the implications of beauty for user’s decisions to opt-in 
to verification. 
3.3 Experiment 
3.3.1 Research Context 
To examine the research questions highlighted earlier, I collaborate with one of the 
leading online dating platforms in the U.S, which has over 1 million registered users 
in the U.S. Similar to most online dating websites, it offers the following features to 
its users: Users create their online profiles where they introduce themselves as well as 
reveal their preferences on seeking partners. User profiles typically also include 
photos. The platform offers a decentralized system wherein users perform a targeted 
search for potential partners that filters the profiles by age, location, and other 
demographic variables. Users are also able to browse others’ profiles without 
limitations and at no cost.  
3.3.2 Experimental Design 
I randomly select over 20,000 users for my experiment and randomly assign each user 
into one of three groups. The treatments are verification invitations sent just once to 
each user who is currently online. It is to maximize the probability that the subject 
gets the message and reads it as compared to offline messages or emails. 
Acknowledging gender differences as documented in literature, I block on gender to 
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make sure males and females are distributed proportionally across groups (Histch et 
al., 2010b; Fisman et al., 2006). The invitation message describes that the verification 
uses one’s phone number, and the purpose of the verification is to reduce ‘scams’ and 
to make sure that others know that ‘you’ are real. The message for Treatment I (T1) 
says it will charge users 50 virtual coins (equiv. $2) if they pass the verification while 
the message for Treatment II (T2) validates the phone number for free. I also 
emphasize, in the message, that the platform will never disclose or share this 
information with anyone else. This is to alleviate people’s concern about privacy that 
may hinder their willingness to verify. Each phone number can be used to verify only 
one user’s profile. Specifically, if one chooses to verify, the user is directed to a cell 
phone verification page upon clicking the verification link in the message. Once the 
user successfully validates the verification code sent to the phone through SMS, 
he/she will get a verification badge that is displayed on his/her profile page as well as 
the search page14. The detailed design is illustrated in Figure 1 and the verification 
badge is as shown in Figure 2.  
3.4 Measures 
3.4.1 Variables 
According to my research questions, I track three sets of outcomes. I track the 
verification decisions for all subjects in the treatment groups to answer Q1. I also 
track the messaging behavior among participants for 2 weeks for Q2 since it is the 
ultimate indicator, in an online platform, of strong interest with higher potential for 
offline date and matching. Specifically, as shown in Table 1, I track the initiation 
stages of the messages as well as the ultimate matching. I examine conversations 
originating from both sides; a conversation can be initiated by the focal users or by 
the potential partner. Similarly, a conversation match, defined as a three-round back-
and-forth conversation following prior literature (Hitsch et al. 2010, Bapna et al. 
                                                
14 Please note that verification is not a factor in ranking. In other words, being verified or not doesn’t 
affect where a user locates in others’ search results.  
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2016), can be initiated by the focal user or by the potential partner. I calculate these 
outcome variables within a certain time window with the notation of outcome_Xtime. 
For instance, I mainly use verify_1day and verify_1week to study verification 
decisions within 1day after treatment and within 1 week after treatment respectively. 
Similarly, I use msg_sent_1week, msg_received_1week to measure the messages 
outward and inward within a week respectively. I take log transformation for all 
outcomes of msg_sent, msg_received, msg_sent_match and msg_received_match 
since they are count numbers.  
To further study the heterogeneous treatment effects and associate them with 
different user types, I also link the experiment data with subjects’ information 
disclosed to others, e.g., income, as well as statistics summarized by the platform. I 
list the detailed coding of each variable in Table 1.   
3.4.2 Beauty using Deep Learning   
Beauty is a valuable trait for users seeking a match. However, beauty is a more 
important attribute for females, as it ranks highest in terms of what males look for in 
potential partners (Hitsch et al. 2010b; Fisman et al., 2006). To obtain this missing 
measure, I use a deep-learning technique to predict the beauty of female users in my 
sample, based on their photos. There are a number of techniques to code beauty, 
including manual coding. However, such manual coding techniques do not scale well 
and also lead to privacy concerns. Increasingly, supervised machine learning 
approaches, rather than human raters, are growing in popularity due to their high 
scalability and consistency on rating criteria. I choose deep learning over other 
models due to its superior performance on image-related tasks (Malik et al., 2017; 
Krzhevsky et al., 2012; Taigman et al., 2014).  
I follow a recent paper that tackles the problem of facial beauty prediction 
(Liang et al., 2018). The authors collected a dataset of face images and annotated 
each image with a beauty score between 1 and 5. They propose to use deep neural 
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networks for the task, due to their extraordinary ability to learn powerful image 
representations. Thanks to the public availability of their dataset, I are able to train 
my own deep neural networks to predict beauty scores without having to risk 
unintended leakage of private user data. For my task, I only consider the female faces 
in the dataset that have the same racial composition as in my test examples. I modify 
the last layer of DensetNet-121 (Huang, et al., 2017), one of the state-of-the-art deep 
learning models, to directly output a scalar value as the predicted score. I also 
experimented with a few other models and found that DenseNet-121 performs the 
best due to its commensurateness with the size of my training set and hence its ability 
to avoid both under-fitting and over-fitting. The trained model predicts for each input 
image a score between 1 and 5. In Table 2, I show the results obtained from five-fold 
cross validation. My final model achieves a mean absolute error of 0.24 and a mean 
squared error of 0.10. Both errors are close to what the authors report in the paper.   
To use my trained model for facial beauty prediction on a new image, I apply 
a preprocessing step to crop out the face(s) in the image using a state-of-the-art face 
detection algorithm. Images with no face or multiple faces detected are dropped out 
(roughly 2% of all). I extract beauty score from each female user’s leading profile 
picture15. Another alternative is to average across multiple images for a user, and this 
generates consistent results. 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
Before analyzing the results, I first examine whether the randomization works well by 
comparing the key covariates across groups. I find no statistically significant 
differences among the covariates across groups. Summary statistics are presented in 
Table 3 where I demean variables across groups to respect the non-disclosure 
agreement (NDA). 
                                                
15 It is shown in the search page and is the landing picture on the profile page. 
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3.5.1 Question 1 – Verification Decisions 
Q1a: Given the Option to Verify, Who Would Choose to Verify? 
Since the treatments are assigned randomly to each user, I estimate an OLS to obtain 
the causal effect of the two treatments on the users’ choices of verification. Since 
gender difference has been suggested in previous literature (Hitsch et al., 2010; Bapna 
et al., 2016), Irun all the regression analyses for males and females respectively. 
𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦! = 𝛼! ∗ 𝑇!" +  𝜀!    (1) 
As shown in Table 4, I observe that on average 8% of users choose to verify their 
phone numbers in T1 while an additional 2% of users choose to verify in T2. Such 
differences are directly attributable to the differences in the costs of verification. By 
evaluating the verification decision over different time windows, I find that most 
users make their decision on the same day of treatment and it stabilizes after week 1.  
An interesting question related to this optional choice of verification is which 
types of users choose to verify. Signaling theories posit that given information 
asymmetry, the higher type users are more likely to verify to differentiate themselves 
from lower type users. In keeping with this, I segment males and females respectively 
into Low-, Medium- and High- types, based on their charm score on the platform16. As 
in Formula 1, I estimate an OLS regression to obtain the average rate of verification 
across quality-tiers, i.e., L-type, M-type and H-type. As shown in Table 5, I find that 
males display a pattern that matches the conventional prediction of signaling theories 
– a monotonic distribution of increasing opt-in rate in higher-type males. However, 
interestingly, I observe a different pattern for females. It is the M-type females that 
have the highest opt-in rate, rather than the H-type or L-type females. The verification 
rate among H-type females is actually statistically significantly lower than 
verification rate among M-type females. There is emerging empirical evidence of 
such non-monotonic pattern in recent literature of signaling and voluntary quality 
                                                
16 The charm score is created and used by the collaborating platform to track each user’s popularity.  
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disclosure. However, my study is among the first to document differential adoption 
decisions across two sides of the same platform where users on the two sides 
strategically use the same signal differently.  
Q1b: What is the Underlying Mechanism of the Differential Decisions? 
I further examine the underlying mechanism of such differential opt-in decisions 
among males and females. As the literature in signaling points out H-type users are 
more likely to adopt a new signal when the existing signals are noisy or weak and 
when the new signal adds value to the existing signal or attributes (Jovanovic, 1982; 
Riley, 2001; Spence, 1978). However, the opposite is more likely when the existing 
signal is strong and credible (Feltovich et al, 2002; Gambetta and Székely, 2014; 
Luca et al., 2015). I therefore examine the existing signals in my setting, which in my 
setting are the attributes accessible to all users on the profile page, and associate them 
with the differential opt-in decisions. Following the prior literature of dating and 
marriage on gender differences (Histch et al., 2010b; Fisman et al., 2006), I 
specifically examine beauty in females and income in males as they play a dominant 
role in sorting preferences. As shown in Figure 3, income of H-type males and beauty 
of H-type females both rank highest within their gender, compared to M- and L- types. 
H-type females with their existing favorable dominant signal would be less likely to 
adopt the new signal compared to M-type (Luca et al., 2015). Therefore, in my 
context, I conjecture that H-type females rely on their high status of beauty so that 
verification signal has a much higher value to M-type females than to H-type females. 
To formally test this hypothesis, I examine how beauty plays a role in H-type females’ 
opt-in decisions. As shown in Table 6 (a), I find that among H-type females, more 
beautiful users (above-median) are even less likely to verify than below-median users, 
consistent with the underlying rationale in this emerging thread of literature. As a 
robustness check, I find the opposite pattern within the M-type females, wherein the 
more beautiful M-type users (above-median) are more likely to verify, further 
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indicating that M-type females use this verification as a signal to differentiate from 
lower types. 
The next question asks, why do H-type males, on the other hand, behave 
differently from H-type females when they also have higher values of income than 
M-type males. To examine this, I follow the same format to investigate how income 
correlates with the males’ opt-in decisions. Consistent with the monotonic pattern in 
the traditional prediction of signaling, I find that higher income males (above-median) 
are more likely to opt-in to verification than lower income males (below median) both 
within H-type males and within M-type males, as shown in Table 6 (b). In line with 
the theories of signaling, I find that the decision to signal or not in my context 
depends on whether the existing key signal is credible or not (Boulding and Kirmani, 
1993; Feltovich et al, 2002; Spence, 1978). Specifically, income of males, which is 
self-disclosed, value, and although valuable to the female side, tends to be uncertain 
and noisy. Thus, H-type males have a stronger incentive to adopt this new signal of 
willingness to share personal information to complement their existing attributes and 
to further differentiate from lower-types. On the other hand, beauty inferred from 
photos, is much less noisy and more easily verifiable. H-type females relying on high 
values on beauty are hence, less likely to opt-in to verification while M-type females 
who rank lower in beauty are more likely to verify to enhance their profiles. In other 
words, the differential opt-in decisions between males and females in my context are 
driven by the difference in the credibility of the existing dominant signals for males 
and females.  
I want to clarify how the new verification signal works differently than 
income or beauty. The vertical differentiation within males or females has been 
established given the existing signals, mainly contributing by income of males and 
beauty of females. Due to the difference in the credibility of these key attributes, male 
and female users have different opt-in decisions about the new signal – phone 
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verification. The new signal has nothing to do with the differentiation along income 
or beauty, but helps to indicate a user’s willingness to share personally identifiable 
information, which is also a favorable attribute to see in a potential partner, especially 
in online settings. As mentioned earlier, users consider whether or not to leverage this 
new signal to further differentiate along the “willingness to share” dimension in order 
to improve the overall popularity, depending on whether their existing signals are 
sufficient to serve the overarching goal of getting more demand. It suggests that 
platforms can easily implement such very simple phone verification mechanism to 
mitigate the noisiness of online information and to facilitate further differentiation 
among users. 
I seek to collect more supporting evidence for understanding what verification 
signal represents by conducting a survey among platform users. I conjecture that the 
verification badge indicates willingness to share personal information and it tends to 
serve as a more credible and stronger signal than information already disclosed 
online. This is because it is the only verifiable information available and because the 
other information shared publicly does not tie to a person’s identity so close as one’s 
phone number. It is more privacy sensitive and more likely to be used for identifying 
a real-world person. In order to validate my conjecture, I design a survey to ask for 
people’ LinkedIn information, similar to how I ask for phone verification. Between 
Facebook and LinkedIn, I choose the latter as it is even more sensitive and relates to 
professional life. If my hypothesis holds, I expect to observe that users who have 
verified their phone number are more likely to verify LinkedIn account compared to 
users who opt out phone verification. Among the 3450 users who respond to my 
survey, I do find a favoring pattern that users who are willing to verify phone number 







3.5.2 Question 2 – Verification Impact 
I then examine the causal impacts of verification on verified users on different sides 
in terms of both quantity and quality. I further decompose these impacts based on 
user types to understand the differential benefits and validate ex ante expectations. To 
formally investigate ex post effects, I briefly introduce my identification strategy. I 
randomize on group level that makes the recipient of a treatment exogenous. My 
focus is on the impact of the treatment on the treated users who opt-in for verification, 
rather than on the overall population who get assigned treatments T1 or T2. Such 
treatment effect on the treated (TOT) can be obtained in two ways. One is a standard 
instrumental-variable approach with randomized treatment as an instrument for 
verification, or a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) framework (Angrist et al., 
1996; Angrist et al., 2008). This randomized treatment is a strong instrument since it 
is an exogenous assignment that only correlates with verification but is uncorrelated 
with subsequent behavior. The alternative is to adopt the intention-to-treat framework 
to get the intention-to-treat (ITT) overall effect on treatment group level. I then use 
the opt-in ratio to attribute the treatment effect back to verified users only, the portion 
that fully accounts for the incremental change. These two frameworks are the same in 
my setting where there are no ‘always-takers’ who can opt-in verification in the 
control group, as shown in Formula 2 (Angrist et al., 1996; Angrist et al., 2008). 
Therefore, I report using ITT to TOT framework that has the additional advantage to 
compare between T1 and T2 and across user types. Results using LATE as robustness 
check are consistent. 
𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦! = 𝛼! ∗ 𝑇!" +  𝜀!       
                           𝑀𝑠𝑔_𝑋! = 𝛽 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦! +  𝜎!                     (2) 
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The main outcomes I choose are the number of messages shared between 
potential partners since it is the ultimate indicator, in an online platform, of strong 
interest and the potential for offline date and matching (see Table 2). I focus on 
conversations originating from both sides - initiated by the focal users or by the 
potential partner. I take log transformation since these message measures are count 
numbers. All estimations follow the same framework as in Formula 2 but varying 
dependent variables, msg_X. I focus on the paid verification T1 in the first two 
sections and discuss its comparison with free verification T2 in the end. 
Q2a: How does Verification Impact the Potential Partners of Verified Users?  
Following signaling theories, I hypothesize that ex ante choices of focal users should 
align with ex post responses of potential partners. Specifically, verified users should 
receive increased attention and from higher quality users. I therefore examine both 
the changes in quantity of the messages received as well as the changes in quality 
(popularity) of the senders who initiate the messages. As shown in Table 7, I confirm 
that verification leads to an increase in messages received from others, and more 
importantly, it results in an increase in sender quality as well, measured by the 
average charm score of the message senders.  
To understand the heterogeneity of the effects, I further decompose the impact 
across each type of users for males and females respectively. Theoretically, the 
benefit should align with ex ante differential opt-in decisions that H-type males 
should benefit the most among verified males while M-type females should benefit 
the most among verified females. I follow the same regression above but adding user 
types and interaction terms with treatment assignment, T1 or T2. As shown in Table 
8, I confirm that H-type males benefit the most from verification among males as the 
coefficients of H-type*T1 for both quantity and quality are significantly greater than 
coefficients of M-type*T1 and of L-type*T1. On the other hand, M-type females 
benefit the most from verification among females both quantitatively and 
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qualitatively since the coefficients of M-type*T1 are significantly greater than the 
other two interaction terms. Moreover, such increased attention on M-type females 
does not harm H-type females, as there is no significant decrease in either messages 
received or sender quality among H-type females. I further show that with the help of 
verification, M-type females successfully attract more attention from males and such 
improvement in their popularity brings them closer to H-type females. However, H-
type females still have more messages received than M-type females as shown in 
Table 9 – suggesting that beauty as reflected in the images serves as a more credible 
signal for females. 
Q2b: How does Verification Impact the Verified Users Themselves?  
Besides examining that verification is an effective signaling device, I am also 
interested in whether and how verification impacts the verified users themselves. 
Interestingly, I do observe a behavioral change of verified users as compared to their 
‘counterfactuals’ in the control group. As shown in Table 10, verified users become 
more proactive and are more likely to initiate messages to more potential partners. 
More interestingly, they become more selective and contact higher type users, 
measured by the average charm score of the message receivers. Such increased pro-
activeness on the female side is very meaningful to the platform since generally 
females are more passive and less likely to proactively engage in online dating 
(Bapna et al. 2016). I further decompose this behavioral change across user types as 
shown in Table 11. I find that H-type males and M-type females send out the most 
messages to better types compared to other types within the same gender, consistent 
with the outcomes of message receiving. All results reported here use data within 1 
week, and using other time windows generates consistent results, e.g., 2 weeks. 
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3.5.3 Question 3 – Impacts of Verification for the Platform 
Q3a: How does Verification Impact Matching between the Two Sides? 
I first discuss the sending and receiving behaviors of verified users as these are the 
initial step that would lead to a match. Among males, H-type males who are most 
likely to verify, are now able to further differentiate themselves from M-type males, 
leading to an average increase in both quantity of messages received and the quality 
of the senders of those messages. On the other hand, verified M-type females are able 
to further differentiate themselves from L-type females and receive more messages 
from higher type males.  These positive outcomes for H-type males and M-type 
females are further strengthened as these verified users become more proactive in 
sending out messages to potential partners.  
Such improvements for M-type females and H-type males are desirable to 
online dating platform as platforms are eager to design effective mechanism to 
balance the attention between the most popular users and the less popular ones to 
enhance market coverage (Roth, 2015). At the same time, platforms also strive to 
facilitate high quality matches that require appropriate information mechanism to 
promote high quality users (Roth, 2015). Specifically, I find that optional verification 
can help enhance M-type females’ profiles without hurting H-type females. It also 
helps H-type males to stand out so that females can more easily identify a potential 
good match. 
Next I examine how optional verification impacts matching of the two sides 
on the platform. As shown in Table 12, consistent with the initial stage, there is a 
significant increase in matching quantity for both verified males and verified females. 
In particular, as shown in Table 13 it is the H-type verified males and M-type verified 
females who benefit the most from verification. Such beneficial effects do not solely 
come from an increase in matches that are initiated by others, but more importantly, 
are driven by the increased pro-activeness of the verified users. This optional 
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verification has a two-pronged effect. It not only helps verified individuals to get 
more matches through better differentiation but also causes verified users to reach out 
to more and better potential partners. It also benefits the platform as a whole by 
balancing the attention among females, and increasing the overall coverage.  
Q3b: How does Paid Verification Differ from Free Verification? 
A practical question for a platform designer is whether to charge for verification or 
not given its benefit to users. To provide actionable implications, I design two 
treatments in my experiment to causally examine the difference between paid 
verification and free verification on users’ opt-in decisions as well as subsequent 
impact on messaging behaviors. In examining the opt-in decisions, paid verification 
results in smaller verification rate due to its additional monetary cost (Table 4). In 
examining the impacts of verification, I find that both types of verification are 
effective, but free verification (T2) generates weaker results in both receiving and 
sending messages (see Table 7-8 and 10-11). It is pertinent to note that these 
differences among verified users between the two treatment groups do not affect the 
identification of the causal impact of verification. I use TOT to identify the causal 
impact of paid verification and free verification respectively. To summarize, free 
verification and paid verification are both effective with a tradeoff that free 
verification induces more coverage of verification while paid verification leads to 
more pronounced individual benefit. Platform designers may take their current goal 
into consideration, e.g., increase overall credibility, or promote more proactive 
individual behaviors, to decide which one to implement. 
3.6 Conclusion 
While online platforms place information symmetry at the center, markets with few 
alternative information mechanisms may face an even bigger challenge. Unlike 
mandatory verification mechanism that helps enhance overall security and credibility 
of the platform, optional verification in my study enables individual users to 
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strategically adopt a positive signal to differentiate themselves from other users on the 
platform. I examine the effectiveness of such optional verification in an online dating 
market where there is no reputation system available and all information is self-
disclosed. More importantly, I investigate who would adopt this signal, and I see 
interesting and differential opt-in patterns between males and females that they use 
the same signal differently, depending on their existing signals. This study is among 
the first to design and conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment to examine 
these two important questions in an online matching platform.  
My paper contributes to, and compliments, previous literature in a number of 
ways. In keeping with the literature on voluntary disclosure and signaling, theorists 
suggest “peaches” tend to signal to differentiate from “lemons”. There is some 
emerging evidence that it is not always the case – sometimes M-types have a stronger 
incentive to signal, but the majority of the work is either theoretical or lab 
experiments. I provide empirical evidence based on a large-scale study to add to this 
emerging line of work. More importantly, my context is unique in that users on both 
sides of the platform can adopt the same signal. I am among the first to document 
heterogeneous opt-in patterns between two sides of a matching market whereas 
existing work identifies a homogenous pattern that H-type is either more likely or less 
likely to signal than lower types within the subjects of interest. I also add to the 
literature on the effects of verification. Previous literature has examined the effects of 
verification but overlooked its strategic role as a signal in a market with no alternative 
signals. I am among the first to design a randomized controlled experiment to draw 
causal inference, and I carefully choose online dating market to isolate the standalone 
effect of verification. I am add to the broader literature on the impacts of voluntary 
disclosure by identifying an interesting two-pronged effect of verification – increased 
attention from the others as well as increased pro-activeness of the verified users 
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themselves. Finally, I contribute to the nascent body of work that applies deep 
learning to business research.  
My findings provide useful insights for matching market designers and 
platform owners on how to effectively design and implement verification. I 
demonstrate the value of optional verification that maintains the minimal mandatory 
screening cost and effort but serves as a very effective signal to users on the platform 
by fostering desirable engagement and matching outcomes. Moreover, the 
comparison between free verification and paid verification suggests that even free 
verification can foster a similar, albeit weaker, impact - there is a tradeoff between 
higher coverage of free verification and lower pro-activeness. Platforms can choose 





Chapter 4: Your Preference or Mine? A Randomized Field 




Peer-to-peer two-sided matching markets have become major players across many 
industries, e.g., labor markets, crowd-funding, and online dating. With the rapid 
growth of these markets, the choices for users expand exponentially exacerbating 
search frictions. Consequently, platforms resort to personalized recommender systems 
as one of the most effective approaches to improve the efficiency of search and 
matching. While researchers and practitioners generally focus on product 
recommendations in transactional markets, there is a dearth of research that studies 
user recommendations in two-sided matching markets. 
User recommendation in two-sided matching markets differs from product 
recommendation in transactional markets due to some fundamental characteristics 
that distinguish the two types of markets. First, a match on a two-sided matching 
platform is a bilateral decision, as opposed to a purchasing decision in E-commerce, 
that eventually depends on the preferences of both sides of the markets - focal users 
on one side vs. potential matches on the other side (e.g., employers vs. employees in a 
labor market, or men vs. women in a dating market). Given this two-sided nature, 
focal users may make different choices when the recommendations are generated 
based on the other side’s preference. Another distinction relates to the bandwidth 
issue of recommendations, especially those in high demand. In transactional markets, 
a popular item (say, a best-seller) can be recommended to multiple users. However, it 
is not ideal for matching markets to recommend the same popular candidate to many 
potential partners since only a few are likely to get a response. This congestion may 
lead to fewer matches for the platform as the whole.  
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Clearly, when designing user recommendations on two-sided matching 
platforms, more attention needs to be paid on the candidate pool regarding what 
preference information is used and how it impacts the platform as a whole. Yet, most 
online matching platforms provide recommendations similar to that of transactional 
platforms – their recommendations are largely based on the preferences of the focal 
user (Horton, 2017). It may not be the optimal practice considering the differences 
between the two types of markets. Previous studies in Economics and Information 
Systems have provided some theoretical and empirical pointers to the potential 
benefits by including the other side’s preferences. The findings suggest that providing 
the information about the other side’s preferences can lead to strategic behaviors of 
the focal users and such provisioning is likely to improve matching outcomes (Avery 
& Levin, 2010; Cole et al., 2013). However, there have been no field studies that 
empirically examine its implications for the design of recommender systems in two-
sided matching markets. 
I seek to bridge this gap and start by investigating how the usage of potential 
matches’ preferences in recommender systems impacts focal users’ decision-making. 
Specifically, I seek to understand what preference information should be used in 
recommender systems and how it impacts user decision-making and matching 
outcomes. From the perspective of choices and preferences, the research question can 
be viewed as in two-sided matching markets, whether and how people make different 
choices when the choice set includes or precludes the other side’s preferences. From 
the perspective of information provisioning, I can think of the question as to whether 
and how users’ decisions are affected when the other side’ preferences are made 
available. The choice sets and the preference information presented to the focal users 
here are generated by recommender systems. 
Three recommender systems are developed to examine how focal users 
respond differently. The first system uses the focal users’ preference (“Your 
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Preferences”). The second system is based on potential matches’ preferences 
(“Potential Matches’ Preferences”). The third takes mutual preferences into 
consideration (“Mutual Preferences”). All other elements of the three recommender 
systems are held the same, including the feature set and the prediction model, to make 
comparisons meaningful. In other words, the three recommender systems only differ 
in the input data for candidate generation, by using the preference information of the 
different sides. 
To examine the research question based on real user behavior, I collaborate 
with one of the leading online dating platforms in the U.S. and design and conduct a 
randomized field experiment. I choose online dating as the representative context not 
only due to its prevalence but also due to its flexibility to conduct randomized field 
experiments compared to other matching markets (Coles et al. 2010; Hitsch et al. 
2010). Besides the three treatment groups that respectively implement the three 
recommendation systems, there is a control group with a baseline model. As opposed 
to the common baseline choice that shows a random list of users, I modify it to 
randomly show the top popular users to serve as a “higher” baseline. To avoid carry-
over effects, I adopt a between-subject design that makes sure every subject is 
assigned only to one group of the experiment. Furthermore, the treatment contains 
two inseparable elements 17 : 1) recommendations generated by the assigned 
recommender system, which, compared to the recommender systems in other 
treatment groups, only differs in the preference information used as input, and 2) the 
associated title of the assigned recommender system to inform users what preference 
information is used to generate the recommendations. This study seeks to provide 
design implications for two-sided matching platforms on what preference information 
should be used so the recommendation content needs to be truly based on different 
                                                
17 It would be interesting to separate the two elements and examine only one of them, 
however, these are beyond the interest and goal of this paper and can be pursued as 
future directions.  
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preferences rather than merely a manipulation of framings without changing the 
content. This is consistent with the literature on preference signals (Avery & Levin, 
2010; Cole et al., 2013), which notes that the information has to be ‘transparent’ to 
the focal users for it to be effective. Finally, users are also informed that the ordering 
of the candidates is based on the fitness of the designated preference. For instance, in 
“People who might prefer you” group, candidates on the top have a higher likelihood 
of preferring the focal users than the candidates on the bottom.  
In examining the effects, I find that users are responsive to “the other side’s 
preferences”, which leads to both quantitative and qualitative impacts on the 
platform. Specifically, users in the “People who might prefer you” group and “Mutual 
Preferences” group are as proactive as users in the “Your Preferences” group; they all 
initiate more messages to the recommended candidates than in the control group. 
Interestingly, I further observe that focal users in the “Potential Matches’ 
Preferences” group and “Mutual Preferences” groups tend to choose the candidates 
who are more likely to prefer them regardless of these candidates’ desirability 
whereas people in “Your Preferences” group tend to seek highly desirable candidates. 
It is worth mentioning that in my study, users are not bounded by the limited 
recommendation choices; the platform provides a target search tool that ensures that 
every subject has the same opportunity to look for desirable partners. Interestingly, 
given the equal search access to all users on the platform, the qualitative difference of 
message receivers across groups only happens among those recommended candidates, 
not the candidates from search results. It further assures that those focal users in 
“Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” are not switching to 
lower desirable users in general but are responding to the recommended candidates 
who are more likely to “prefer” them. My results indicate that users value the other 
side’s preference and act upon it when such information is available.  
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The positive effect on message initiation by using “the other side’s 
preference” is further amplified in the examination of responses and matches as the 
message receivers in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” 
groups respond more to the message proposals. I find that while “Your Preferences” 
group receives more responses than the control group, “Potential Matches’ 
Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” groups even outperform “Your Preferences” 
group. Therefore, providing the other side’s preferences (“Potential Matches’ 
Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences”) does lead to more matches than only 
considering the focal user’s preferences (“Your Preferences”). Such an increase may 
result from the novelty and diversity of choices generated by “Potential Matches’ 
Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” recommender systems, motivating focal users 
to explore and finally convert to matches. It may also be likely that users react 
strategically to the newly added information of the other side’s preference; they tend 
to maximize the replies and matches. Further, there are heterogeneous effects wherein 
users who search broadly benefit more from “People who might prefer you” and 
“Mutual Preferences” recommendations whereas “Your Preferences” benefits users 
who search narrowly.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of my 
knowledge, it is among the first to examine the design and impact of user 
recommendation in a two-sided matching market that is fundamentally different from 
product recommendations. Second, it extends the literature on preference information 
disclosure and preference signaling to a new setting where the preference on the other 
side is provided by the platform’s recommendation system. Further, I am among the 
first to design and conduct a randomized field experiment to investigate user 
recommendations in a two-sided matching market. It allows us to observe users’ real-
world choices and matching outcomes. These findings provide valuable implications 
to two-sided matching platforms and highlight the significance of including the other 
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side’s preference in the recommender systems. Such inclusion not only helps to 
improve user engagement and matching outcomes, but also potentially reduces the 
disproportionate focus on the most popular users due to the diversity of users that are 
recommended as potential candidates for matching. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, prior work is reviewed to outline my 
contributions. The research context is then described to provide details on the online 
dating platform as a representative of two-sided matching market. It is followed by 
discussion of my experimental design as well as the details of the recommender 
systems I deploy. Variables and results are presented and I conclude with managerial 
implications. 
4.2 Prior Literature  
My paper closely relates to three streams of research. The first two streams of work 
examine recommender systems from different perspectives; one from the business 
perspective of recommender systems on how they impact users and platforms, and the 
other from the technical perspective of optimal design of recommender systems. The 
third stream of research draws upon studies on preference information provision and 
preference signaling to serve as the theoretical underpinning for how focal users may 
make choices differently when the recommendations are generated using different 
preference information.  
There is emerging literature in the domains of information systems and 
economics that examines how recommender systems change users and online markets. 
Researchers have been focusing on either the quantitative or the qualitative side of the 
impact. On the one hand, researchers have found a positive effect of recommender 
systems on sales (Fleder and Hosanagar, 2009; De et al, 2010; Oestreicher-Singer and 
Sundararajan, 2012). On the other hand, some studies investigate how recommender 
systems shape consumers’ choices – whether the introduction of recommender 
systems leads to more fragmented or unified choices collectively. However, mixed 
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results are reported in different markets and contexts. For instance, Brynjolfsson et al. 
(2011) find that recommender systems lead to an increase in sales diversity while 
Hosanagar et al (2014) find that it leads to an increase in commonality in music 
choices. Moreover, several studies have shown the co-existence of an increase in 
diversity and an increase in commonality, albeit on different levels of analysis (Fleder 
and Hosanagar, 2009; Lee and Hosanagar, 2014). The existing studies along this line 
focus mostly on product recommendations in transactional markets. Given distinctive 
market characteristics of two-sided matching markets, my study seeks to be among 
the first to examine user recommendation in this setting. I complement this line of 
research by examining both the quantitative and qualitative impacts on user’s 
decision-making in a two-sided matching market.  
In contrast to studying the business impact, studies from computer science 
focus on the performance of recommender systems algorithms. Some recent papers 
have proposed recommendation algorithms for matching problems (Pizzato, et al, 
2010; Xia, et al et al, 2015). As my focus is to investigate when using the same 
algorithm, how different sources of preferences would impact users’ choices and 
matches differently, I adopt an existing algorithm in Pizzato et al’s (2010) to obtain 
established recommendation performance. From the design aspect, I make additional 
effort to reduce biases of favoring popular users and confounding factors of inferring 
preference. From the evaluation aspect, existing studies evaluate new algorithms 
using secondary data while I design and conduct a randomized online field 
experiment to observe users’ real choices and matches.  
Finally, I draw from the emerging literature on preference disclosure and 
preference signaling in Economics and Information Systems to provide supporting 
evidence that incorporating the other side’s preferences in the recommender systems 
may be beneficial to the users and the platform. There is empirical evidence that 
presenting a focal user with information regarding the preferences of another user 
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tends to increase the chance of a match between the two (Avery & Levin, 2010). Such 
provision of the other side’s preferences serves as a weak signal that prompts focal 
users to proactively connect with potential matches. Some theoretical work also 
suggests that the focal users would be more likely to accept one’s proposal if it comes 
along with a credible signal of preferences (Cole et al., 2013). These theoretical and 
empirical evidences tend to support the fact that focal user’s decision-making is 
affected by the awareness of the other side’s preference in a matching market. 
However, in the existing studies, the preference signal sent to the focal users is 
directly from another user, e.g., a proposal or a profile visit. It is not clear how focal 
users react when the preference of the other side is based on predictions, and when 
the preference signal is sent by the platform. My study, therefore, extends this line of 
literature with a relaxed condition of predicted preference information.  
4.3 Methods and Data 
4.3.1 Research Context  
I collaborate with one of the leading online dating platforms in the U.S, which has 
more than 1 million registered users. As with most online dating websites, it offers 
the following features to users. First, users can create their own online profiles to 
introduce themselves. User profiles typically also include photos. Moreover, the 
platform offers a decentralized search tool wherein users can filter profiles by age, 
location and other demographic attributes to find potential matches. These targeted 
search results can be sorted based on location distance or user tenure from registration. 
Users are able to browse others’ profiles without limitations and at no cost. There is 
no personalization or recommendation on this platform before my experiment.  
4.3.2 Experimental Design  
Based on preference information from the two sides on the platform (focal users on 
one side vs. potential matches on the other side), I compare three recommendation 
algorithms that are based on 1) focal users’ preference (“Your Preferences”), 2) the 
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other side’s preferences (“Potential Matches’ Preference”), and 3) mutual preferences 
(“Mutual Preferences”) respectively. Since I are interested in how information about 
the different preferences impact user’s decision-making, I use the same features and 
the same recommendation model but only alter the input information by leveraging 
preferences from different sides of the market. The control group outputs the top 
popular users in a random order to create a better baseline group than the commonly 
used benchmark - “generating a random list of users” as it makes sure the provided 
options are of high quality. The recommendation system is newly added to the 
platform and the targeted search function remains in use without any changes. I also 
make careful design considerations to account for other factors contributing to users’ 
choices. As suggested by the literature on decision-making, the size of the choice set 
plays a role. Therefore, I fix the number of recommendations for all the four 
recommendation algorithms. I also limit this number to be a reasonable size (i.e., 100 
users) because too many choices may increase the complexity in decision-making due 
to bounded rationality.  
To inform users how the recommendations are generated, a title is provided. 
“Your Preferences” group shows “People you might prefer” while “Potential 
Matches’ Preferences” group uses “People who might prefer you”. “Mutual 
Preferences” group displays “People who you might prefer and who might prefer 
you”, and control group says “System Recommendation”. It is important to disclose 
this information to make sure that users are aware of whether or not the choices are 
incorporated with the other side’s preference. Otherwise, the strategic behavior 
documented in the previous literature would not be induced. In addition, the users are 
also informed regarding the sorting of the recommendations in each group, which is 
based on how compatible these candidates are with the designated preference. 
Specifically, the candidates shown at the top in “Your Preference” group have a 
higher chance of fitting focal users’ own preferences than those candidates at the 
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bottom. The recommendations displayed at the top in “Potential Matches’ 
Preferences” are more likely to prefer the focal users than those ranked at the bottom. 
Following a between-subject design, I randomly assign users to one of the 
four groups. I focus on the users who have interacted with others to be able to extract 
their revealed preference. Once a user is assigned to a group, I always generate 
recommendations using the assigned recommendation system to assure each subject 
is exposed to only one treatment. The recommender system refreshes every day so 
each user will get updated recommendations on a daily basis. New users with no 
historical data will get their recommendations once they start engaging on the 
platform.   
4.3.3 Design of the Recommender Systems 
My interest in this study is not to design new algorithms but to leverage existing 
algorithms and investigate how different preference information would impact users’ 
choices and matches differently. Researchers in computer science have used two 
types of models for matching problems; one is profile-based similarity ranking 
(Pizzato, et al, 2010) and the other is collaborative filtering (Xia, et al et al, 2015)18. 
With careful consideration, I decide to not use the collaborative filtering-based model 
as researchers have found that it tends to favor superstars (Lee and Hosanagar, 2014), 
which may potentially exacerbate the congestion among superstars in two-sided 
matching markets. Following the profile-based similarity ranking approach, I 
implement the recommendation algorithm based on Pizzato et al (2010)’s model, 
which looks for “similar” candidates who are compatible with the preference 
information based on user attributes on profile pages. The algorithm treats users with 
                                                
18 Other supervised machine learning techniques may also be applied to recommender 
systems in two-sided matching markets but have not been studied in previous papers. 
At least in my context, there is data limitation that only positive cases are available 
(i.e., who likes whom) but no negative ones (i.e., who dislike whom) that makes 
supervised models unfeasible. Based on the data description, my conjecture that is 
also the case in the two cited paper in computer science. 
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same profile attributes equivalent despite the fact that these users may differ in 
demand and may be considered differently using collaborative filtering. For details of 
the algorithm, please refer to the original paper (Pizzato, et al, 2010).  
Specifically, the recommender system consists of three parts – input 
preference data, feature set and model as shown in Figure 2. For the three 
recommender systems, I use the same feature set and recommendation model to make 
sure the only difference across “Your Preferences”, “Potential Matches’ Preferences” 
and “Mutual Preferences” recommender systems are the input preference data. 
Specifically, the input preference data in “Your Preferences” recommender system is 
extracted from those people who are visited or contacted by the focal users. The input 
preference data in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” recommender system is extracted 
from those people who have initiated visits and messages to the focal users, and that 
in “Mutual Preferences” recommender system is extracted from the historical partners 
with back-and-forth visitation and conversations. I then extract features from these 
profiles to form preferences. 
The specific features I extract to represent one’s preference are primarily 
based on the profile information since in general people rely on these profile 
attributes to make decisions. The features include age difference between the focal 
user and potential candidates, location proximity, number of photos, income, 
education, length of self-introduction and immigration status. I also include tenure-
length as one feature as users, especially long-time users, are very familiar with all 
the other old users on the platform and thus they may pay more attention to new users.  
I create potential selection pool for each focal user using the active users over 
the last 2 weeks to make sure the potential candidates have been recently active, to 
maximize the response and engagement. For each user, I exclude the ones that they 
have visited over the last 3 months to create a customized selection pool for each user 
that aims to generate useful recommendations rather than redundant information. I 
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calculate a compatibility score of each potential candidate within the selection pool 
and I output only the top one hundred compatible candidates for the focal user. The 
three recommender systems work in the same way and only differ in the source of the 
input preference data. 
Although the focus of this paper is not to develop the best performing 
recommender systems for matching markets, I still seek to improve the existing 
Pizzato’s. Besides using profile-based ranking to mitigate potential biases, the other 
improvements are listed as follows. First, while some prior work use stated 
preferences that are described by users in their profile, I mainly use the revealed 
preference based on historical behaviors of each user, which better reflect their true 
preferences. Along this line, I also carefully pre-process the historical information to 
pick only the initial visitation and messages between each pair as this indicates a 
strong preference compared to visiting back. Moreover, while existing studies 
evaluates new algorithms using secondary data, I design and conduct a randomized 
field experiment to observe the real choices of users. Finally, in order to ensure user 
engagement and observe how users use recommender systems, I update the 
recommendations on a daily basis. 
4.3.4 Variables  
As I focus on the impact on the focal users, I track their subsequent engagement 
behaviors upon receiving the experiment interventions. To obtain a comprehensive 
understanding on how different recommender systems may play a role in focal user’s 
decision-making, I collect outcomes along the messaging funnel from message 
initiation to the other side’s response and to the final match. I follow the previous 
literature in online dating to define matching as a three-round back-and-forth 
conversation since it indicates initial mutual interest of both sides (Hitsch et al. 2010, 
Bapna et al. 2016).  
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I am interested in not only the number of messages initiated by the focal users 
but also who the focal users send the messages to. The number of messages is a direct 
measure of user engagement to indicate the performance of the recommender systems 
while the qualitative aspect of these choices uncovers whether and how the focal 
users choose the candidates differently. These two dimensions working together 
provides us a better understanding of how the usage of different preference 
information in the recommender systems will impact the interaction and matching 
outcomes on the platform. I use charm to measure the overall desirability of each 
candidate, which is developed by the collaborating platform to track each user’s 
popularity or demand. 
I calculate these outcome variables within a certain time window denoted by 
outcome_Xtime. For instance, I focus on the outcomes within one week after 
treatment, so I calculate msg_rec_1week, response_rec_1week and match_rec_1week 
to examine the messages initiated by the focal user, the messages responded by the 
message receivers, and the final matches formed between the focal users and the 
message receivers. I take log transformation of these message counts. Further, as 
focal users can also use targeted search as an alternative way to identify potential 
candidate, I also look at the same series of outcomes initiated from the search. These 
outcomes in parallel serve as an additional check on how users are impacted by the 
introduction of recommender systems. 
To further study the heterogeneous treatment effects, I link the experiment 
data to subjects’ historical behaviors. I are particularly interested in categorizing the 
users based on their prior-experiment decision-making in searching. I segment the 
users based on search diversity – whether the users search broadly or narrowly. I 
speculate this may relate to their openness to explore “who are interested in me”. For 
each user on the platform, I calculate the standard deviation of the charm scores of 
those who the user visits to within two weeks prior to the experiment. I adopt a data-
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driven approach and choose the median of this distribution as the cutoff for 
“broadness”. The subjects in the experiment are labeled as low or high in breadth 
depending on whether the value is below or above the threshold. The detailed coding 
of each variable is listed in Table 1.   
4.4 Results and Discussion 
Since the randomization is done at the focal user level, I use post-experiment 
individual-level data to run OLS regressions across experiment groups. I focus on the 
subsequent behaviors within one week after the treatment. Since gender difference 
has been noted in previous literature (Hitsch et al., 2010; Ravi et al., 2016), I block on 
gender in the randomization and run all the regression analyses for males and females 
respectively. 
I first examine the quantity change across groups to see if the introduction of 
recommender systems leads to more message initiation from the focal users. 
Presumably, if the recommender system provides personalized choices that better fit 
one’s needs, it should outperform the baseline algorithm even though I choose a 
relatively high baseline using top popular users with customization. As shown in 
Table 2, users in “Your Preferences” group on average initiate more messages than 
those in the control group, which further assures that the model and features in use 
work well in practice. More importantly, “Mutual Preference” and “Your Preference” 
groups also outperform the control group. There is no statistically significant 
difference in message initiation across the three treatment groups with different 
recommender systems, indicating that providing recommendations using the other 
side’s preference has an equivalent scale of positive effect on the engagement of focal 
users. 
The result becomes even more interesting when I couple it with the qualitative 
analysis of the message receivers in each group as shown in Table 3. By comparing 
the chose candidates with the unchosen candidates for each focal user across groups, I 
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find that the average desirability or charm scores of the message receivers in “Your 
Preference” group is higher than the charm scores of the unchosen candidates. 
However, the charm scores of chosen candidates in “Potential Matches’ Preference” 
group and “Mutual Preference” group are not always higher than the unchosen 
candidates. In other words, without the other side’s information provided, focal users 
tend to pick the more desirable users from the list of recommended candidates. Yet 
when the matching side’s preference is available, they value such information and are 
willing to choose those less desirable candidates who have a higher chance of 
preferring them. The increases in reaching out in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” 
group and “Mutual Preferences” group are as significant as the increase in “Your 
Preference” group despite the fact that the increases are potentially driven by different 
mechanisms. Users in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” 
react on the access to candidates who are more likely to prefer themselves while the 
users in “Your Preferences” group become more proactive due to a good fit to their 
own preference. It is possible that users are curious about the novel and diverse 
choice sets generated by leveraging the other side’s preferences, and browsing these 
profiles may lead to conversions to conversations. It is also possible that users tend to 
utilize the prediction of the other side’s preference and act upon it to maximize the 
response rate. 
Furthermore, users are not bounded by the limited recommendation choices at 
all as they have a search tool to locate users they prefer. They have the equal access to 
desirable partners with the same search cost using the generic target search. In other 
words, each user has full access to everyone on the platform using the search tool plus 
an additional subset of recommended candidates. The focal users contact candidates 
with lower charm scores in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” is not because users 
have no access to other more desirable candidates but because they intend to choose 
these candidates who may be “less popular” but are more likely to be “interested in 
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themselves”. As robustness checks, I further examine how the quantity and quality of 
message initiation using the search tool are affected at the meanwhile. As shown in 
Table 4, I find there is no statistically significant difference across treatment groups in 
both the numbers of initiated messages and the desirability of the message receivers. 
It means when the provided choices (e.g., from target search) do not contain the other 
side’s preference, the focal users in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual 
Preferences” groups make decisions similarly as their counterparts in “Your 
Preferences” group. 
I further examine responses and matches along the messaging funnel. As 
shown in Table 5, I find that the positive effect of the recommender systems carries 
on, which leads to an increase in replies in all treatment groups. More importantly, 
“Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” groups get even more 
responses than “Your Preferences” group. Similarly, I find the introduction of the 
recommender systems leads to an increase in final matches in all treatment groups, 
and “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” groups benefit from 
even more matches on average than “Your Preferences” group. Overall, providing the 
other side’s preferences (“Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences”) 
does lead to more matches than only using the focal user’s preferences (“Your 
Preferences”). This outcome gap in matching between “Your Preferences” and the 
other two groups is mainly driven by two aspects. Firstly, conditional on similar 
numbers of messages sent out, users in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual 
Preferences” groups are more likely to get a response, which plays an important role 
in the conversion of final matches. Secondly, the chosen candidates in “Your 
Preferences” group are more popular than those in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” 
and “Mutual Preferences” groups, and thus these candidates from “Your Preferences” 
group tend to have less bandwidth than those in the other two groups to deal with the 
extra incoming messages due to the introduction of recommender systems. 
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Finally, I investigate the heterogeneous effects of each recommender system 
on different user types to gain more insights on what user type would benefit the most 
from which recommender system. I do find that recommender systems have a 
differential impact on different users. I am particularly interested in segmenting users 
based on their search patterns. Specifically, here the user type is based on whether a 
user searches narrowly or broadly. Interestingly, as shown in Table 7, I find that users 
who search broadly have a significant increase in message initiation when offered 
with “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” whereas “Your 
Preference” leads to a significant increase in message sending among users who 
search narrowly. This is consistent with the trend where users who search broadly are 
more likely to be more open-minded to candidates who are not typically their own 
“type” while people who are particular about choices and have a narrow search may 
tend to stick to their own preferences. In addition, given documented gender 
differences in online dating, it is worth mentioning that female and male users have a 
consistent pattern in response to each recommender system. 
4.5 Conclusion  
User recommendation is often deemed as one of the keys to mitigate search friction 
and matching inefficiency in two-sided matching markets, but much less attention, 
both in industry and in academia, has been paid compared to product 
recommendations in transactional markets. With an emphasis on the fundamental 
characteristics of user recommendation in two-sided matching markets, my study 
seeks to fill this gap by starting at examining whether and how the provision of 
potential candidates’ preference can positively impact users’ decision-making and 
overall matching on the platform. 
In collaboration with a leading online dating platform, I carefully design 
recommender systems with the same algorithm but only alter the preference 
information in use. I design and conduct a randomized field experiment to investigate 
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how the recommender system using only the focal user’s preference (i.e., “Users who 
you might prefer”) plays a different role than the recommender systems using the 
other side’s preference (i.e., “Users who might prefer you” and “Users who you might 
prefer and who might prefer you”). Very interestingly, I find that focal users are 
willing to initiate messages to less desirable users than their counterparts when they 
are aware that these recommended candidates are likely to be interested in them. 
These focal users end up sending no fewer messages to these candidates “who may be 
interested in them” compared to their counterparts sending to those “who they may be 
interested in”. Moreover, when it comes to responses and matches, the advantage of 
incorporating the other side’s preference is further consolidated; the focal users in 
“Your Preference” group get a smaller increase in responses and matches than users 
in the other two groups. Clearly, users are sensitive and responsive to “the other 
side’s preference” and value candidates who are likely to prefer them regardless of 
these candidates’ desirability. It leads to a higher volume of matches since the 
message receivers in “Potential Matches’ Preferences” and “Mutual Preferences” 
groups have a higher probability of responding. Further, these recommender systems 
display differential impact on different users based on the diversity of their historical 
search. Users who search broadly are more responsive to “People who might prefer 
themselves” and “Mutual Preferences” while users who search narrowly are more 
interested in “People who I might prefer”. 
My work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I are among the 
first to acknowledge the fundamental characteristics of user recommender systems in 
two-sided matching markets and study the design and impact of user 
recommendations. The study extends the existing literature on the impact of 
recommender systems. Second, there is emerging literature that studies how the 
provision of the preference information from the sender will affect the decisions of 
the receiver, but there is no study examining the implications on recommender 
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systems. My findings therefore complement this line of work and add empirical 
evidence to a different setting where the preference information is prediction and the 
preference signal is not directly sent by the sender. Finally, in terms of identification 
strategies, I are among the first to design and conduct a randomized field experiment 
to examine the impact of user recommendations in a two-sided matching market.  
My findings provide practical insights to the platform designers. The results 
suggest multiple benefits of incorporating the other side’s preference into the 
recommender systems. Besides the greater volume of user engagement and final 
matches, more importantly, these recommender systems facilitate the discovery of 
“seemingly unusual” matches. Without any information on the other side, the focal 
user can only act on their own preferences and look for their preferred “types”. 
However, with the other side’s preference information available upfront, the focal 
users increase the efficiency of their search but also have access to a broader array of 
“types” they would not have reached out to otherwise. Driven either by curiosity or 
efficiency improvements, the focal users get a chance to learn about these candidates 
by browsing their profiles and talking to them, which in turn leads to more matching 
opportunities for the focal users. This also mitigates the overloading problem of 
superstars as more matches are discovered in this manner. Future work can examine 
how the different recommendation systems impact the user and effectiveness of 





Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
Digital platforms have thrived over the last decade. Data analytics and information 
technologies offer new opportunities to these platforms to mitigate the fundamental 
problems of online markets such as information asymmetry and search friction. The 
revolutionary advancements in mobile technologies and machine learning further 
provide competitive advantage to user acquisition and user retention. Every platform 
has to ask the same fundamental question of how to design and provide information 
to users via different mechanisms, including information incentives, differentiation 
signals, personalization, etc. Yet, it is still not clear in this emerging context with 
distinctive characteristics how these information strategies would impact platform 
users and platforms themselves. 
My dissertation therefore seeks to examine the design of effective information 
provisioning strategies for digital platforms to mitigate some real-world significant 
challenges they face and to facilitate user decision-making and matching. I 
collaborate with one transactional platform and one matching platform to examine the 
design of optimal information-provisioning strategies. I conduct three large-scale 
randomized field experiments to causally identify the impact of the introduced 
interventions on customers’ engagement behaviors as well as on matching outcomes. 
 The first essay examines whether platforms can effectively induce mobile app 
adoption through information provisioning, and compares with another widely 
adopted strategy - monetary incentive. I find that while both strategies are effective in 
motivating mobile app adoption, only information provisioning is effective in driving 
long-term increase in sales.  I also identify different patterns of multi-channel usage 
induced by different motivating strategies. These findings provide platforms with 
guidelines on the design of optimal motivating strategies to induce effective mobile 
app adoption that leads to long-term increase in profitability.  
 77 
 
 The second essay investigates optional verification mechanisms to mitigate 
information asymmetry especially for non-transactional markets that lack common 
information mechanisms such as reputation systems and quality assurance. I focus on 
a different role of verification by making it voluntary and visible to other users and 
find that even simple phone verification plays a significant role in these non-
transactional markets and serves as an effective signaling device. I find, however, that 
male and female users as the two sides of the matching market use the same signal in 
very different ways. Such differential patterns are related to the disparity in 
differentiation ability of each side’s existing key attribute, i.e., income for males and 
beauty for females. I also observe that verified users become more proactive and 
reach out to more and better potential partners, which further improves desirable 
matching outcomes and benefits the platform as a whole. My study is among the first 
to document these differential opt-in decisions and the impacts of verification across 
two sides of a matching platform and to provide novel insights on optional 
verification and signaling in two-sided markets. 
 The third essay targets user recommendation to reduce search friction in 
decentralized two-sided matching markets. I seek to understand which side’s 
preference should be considered for recommendation purposes as it relates to the 
fundamental characteristic of matching – a bilateral decision. I design and conduct a 
randomized field experiment to compare how users make choices differently when 
the recommendations suggest 1) who they may be interested in, 2) who may be 
interested in them, and 3) who they may be interested in each other. I implement three 
recommender systems that only differ in what preference information is leveraged. 
Notably, I find users act strategically when they are given candidates who are more 
likely to be interested in themselves, and they are willing to lower their selectivity 
and proactively reach out to those candidates. Recommender systems based on 
potential matches’ preference or mutual preference lead to better matching outcomes 
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than recommender systems solely relying on focal user’s preference, in terms of not 
only quantity but also offloading superstars and promoting other users. The findings 
provide useful design suggestions for two-sided matching platforms as the current 
practice often neglect the preference of the other side when designing recommender 
systems. 
 In each of these studies, in addition to conducting randomized field 
experiments for a clean identification of the causal effects, I also integrate a rich set 
of user characteristics that further allows me to uncover the underlying mechanisms 
of the identified phenomena. To summarize, my dissertation provides both empirical 
contributions and managerial implications to information-provisioning strategies for 
digital platforms and two-sided matching markets. 
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Appendix I. Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: the Contribution of My Study to the Literature on How Monetary 
Incentive and Information may Affect Customers’ Purchases 
 
Figure 1.2: Relationship between Effect of Treatment on Adoption, Effect of 
Induced Adoptions on Purchases (LATE), and Effect of Treatment on Purchases 
(ITT) 
 
The three effects correspond to the Question Q1a, b and c in the Introduction section. 
 
* App adoption consists of organic adoptions (solid part) and induced adoptions (dotted part 
in T1 or dashed part in T2). The ‘induced adoptions’ are influenced by firm’s specific 
interventions. I use the ‘local average treatment effect’ (LATE) approach to identify the 
causal effect of such ‘induced adoptions’ on customers’ purchase behaviors (Q2), for both 




Figure 1.3: Relationship between Effect of Treatment on Adoption, Effect of 
Induced Adoptions on Purchases (LATE), and Effect of Treatment on Purchases 
(ITT) (T1) Email Template for Treatment 1: Highlight incentive for app adoption 
 
 











Figure 2.2. Verification Badge of Verified Users 
 
 
















Appendix II. Tables 
 
Table 1.1: Randomization Check 
 
  Control T1 T2 
p-value 
(C=T1=T2) 
  n = 137,195 n = 48,027 n = 48,070  
Customer tenure (days) Mean 0 -1.32 0.01 0.407 
 Sd 193.4 192.9 193.97  
Total number of purchases Mean 0 0.01 0.01 0.909 
 Sd 3.82 3.69 3.74  
Total Desktop Purchases Mean 0 0.02 0.01 0.726 
 Sd 3.6 3.48 3.52  
Total Mobile Web Purchases Mean 0 -0.01 0 0.384 
 Sd 0.84 0.81 0.83  
Total revenue Mean 0 -0.02 0.21 0.983 
 Sd 237.37 228.19 236.89  
Avg. price of deal purchase Mean 0 -0.39 -0.53 0.481 
 Sd 89.88 82.10 80.83  
Total number of purchased 
categories Mean 2.08 2.08 2.09 0.460 
 Sd 1.44 1.46 1.45  
 
*The figures provided are demeaned values obtained by subtracting the mean value of 
treatment groups from that of control group. Demeaning preserves the difference in 





Table 1.2: Effect of Treatments on Mobile App Adoptions (Q1a) 
     
 download_1day download_3day download_1week download_2week 
     
T1 0.00533*** 0.00931*** 0.00995*** 0.0101*** 
 (0.000347) (0.000497) (0.000543) (0.000626) 
T2 0.00124*** 0.00287*** 0.00328*** 0.00322*** 
 (0.000189) (0.000340) (0.000398) (0.000502) 
Constant 0.000357*** 0.00200*** 0.00325*** 0.00666*** 
 (5.10e-05) (0.000121) (0.000154) (0.000220) 
n 233,292 233,292 233,292 233,292 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
* coefficients of T1 and T2 are significantly different 
 
Table 1.3: Effect of Induced App Adoptions on Purchase Behaviors in the Long 
Run - LATE (Q1b) 
 











-0.274 -0.500 5.081** 10.25** 
 (0.830) (1.476) (2.589) (4.650) 
Constant 0.877*** 1.685*** 0.859*** 1.650*** 
 (0.00613) (0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0201) 
Observations 185,222 185,222 185,265 185,265 
 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*I exclude customers’ purchases within the first 3 weeks to maintain exclusion restriction and 
to focus on customers’ purchase behavior in the long run. The results are robust when 




Table 1.4: Effect of Treatment on Customer Profitability (Q1c), 




T1 0.000407 0.000243 -0.00201 
 (0.00557) (0.00912) (0.0154) 
T2 0.00939* 0.0196** 0.0365** 
 (0.00567) (0.00923) (0.0157) 
Constant 0.490*** 0.990*** 1.798*** 
 (0.00288) (0.00472) (0.00799) 
Observation
s 
233,292 233,292 233,292 
R-squared 0.00001 0.00002 0.00003 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1.5:  Differences in observable characteristics between mobile app 










T1 2.433 1.159 -0.611 -1.485 
 (8.874) (6.724) (5.179) (3.382) 
T2 29.93*** 22.79*** 15.67** 9.644** 
 (10.49) (8.092) (6.193) (3.957) 











T1 0.598 0.784** 0.929*** 0.840*** 
 (0.78) (0.376) (0.313) (0.244) 
T2 -0.633 -0.255 -0.336 -0.153 
 (0.918) (0.452) (0.373) (0.285) 
p (T1 = T2) 0.0584 0.0090 0.0003 0.0007 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 1.6:  Customers’ Purchases within 3 Weeks after App Adoption (short-run 
effect) 
 









     
T1 0.00297 0.00269 0.00165*** -0.000842 
 (0.00214) (0.00184) (0.000326) (0.000845) 
T2 0.00288 0.00313* 0.000631* -0.00107 
 (0.00214) (0.00184) (0.000326) (0.000845) 
Constan
t 
0.114*** 0.0871*** 0.00243*** 0.0198*** 
 (0.00109) (0.000935) (0.000166) (0.000430) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1.7: The Causal Effect of Induced Mobile App Adoptions on Customers’ 
purchases (LATE), after Controlling for Observable Characteristics (Q1b) 












-0.343 -0.629 4.661** 9.464** 
 (0.753) (1.314) (2.321) (4.087) 
Pre_desktop 0.180*** 0.340*** 0.181*** 0.341*** 
 (0.00105) (0.00183) (0.00111) (0.00196) 
Pre_mobile_we
b 
0.308*** 0.584*** 0.304*** 0.572*** 
 (0.00428) (0.00747) (0.00512) (0.00902) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Table 1.8: The Causal Effect of Induced Mobile App Adoptions on Customers’ 
Purchases (LATE), Decomposed by Channel (Q1b) 
  
 Desktop Mobile App Mobile Web 
T1 Money Induced 
App Adoption 0.611 0.176 -0.622* 
 (0.693) (0.146) (0.33) 
T2 Info Induced 
App Adoption 5.399** 0.887** -0.401 
 (2.176) (0.445) (0.998) 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Here I report purchases within 6 months. The results are robust for the 1 year. 
 
Table 1.9: The Causal Effect of Induced Mobile App Adoptions (LATE), on 
Customers' Purchase Diversity 
 
 unique_categories_6month unique_categories_1year 
Induced Adoption by T1 0.261 0.549 
 (0.554) (0.755) 
Induced Adoption by T2 3.719** 4.111* 
 (1.718) (2.319) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1.10: The Causal Effect of Induced Mobile App Adoptions (LATE), 
Decomposed by Cities with High/Low Density Deals 










Induced Adoption by T1 -0.381* 0.148 -0.352 -0.117 
 (0.198) (0.767) (0.333) (1.333) 
Induced Adoption by T2 1.089* 3.872* 3.401*** 6.697* 
 (0.616) (2.349) (1.075) (4.084) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.11: Effect of Information Intervention on Existing Adopter's Purchase 
Behaviors 
 
VARIABLES purch_1month purch_3month 
Providing Info. -0.0305 -0.0901 
 (0.0324) (0.0707) 
Constant 0.363*** 1.058*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0377) 
R-squared 0.001 0.000 
 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 1.12: The Causal Effect of Induced Mobile App Adoptions on Customers’ 
purchases (LATE) across Channels, Decomposed by Pre-Experiment Channel 
Usage 
 
  Purchases within 6 Months 
Desktop Only Purchasers         (n = 190,069)  
Treatment Total Desktop Mobile App Mobile Web 
T1 0.128 1.031 0.118 -0.724*** 
 (0.989) (0.876) (0.159) (0.273) 
T2 5.884** 4.829* 0.882* 0.833 
 (2.915) (2.577) (0.476) (0.798) 
Mobile Purchasers (exclude desktop-only)   (n = 43,134)  
Treatment Total Desktop Mobile App Mobile Web 
T1 -1.491 -0.544 0.355 0.061 
 (1.637) (1.053) (0.314) (0.875) 
T2 1.012 6.818* 0.943 -3.468 
 (5.459) (4.026) (1.052) (3.127) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.1. Individual-level Variable Description 
Outcome Variables Description 
verify whether a user verifies or not (dummy variable) 
msg_sent the total messages sent to others  
msg_received the total messages received from others  
msg_sent_match the total matches driven by the focal user contacting others  




charm charm score based on popularity 
self-description how complete the user’s self-description (0-100%) 
education education level (categorical variable, 0-5). 0 means non-
disclosure 






Table 2.2. Five-fold Cross Validation Performance  
 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
mean absolute error 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.24 





Table 2.3. Summary Stats and Randomization Check 
 Control  T1  T2  p-val 
covariates mean sd mean sd mean sd (C=T1=T2) 
charm 0 2.92 0.03 2.81 0.04 2.85 0.75 
self-description 0 33.70 0.65 33.72 1.19 33.93 0.13 
education 0 1.80 -0.01 1.79 0.01 1.79 0.67 





Table 2.4. Q1a – The Verification Decision among Groups 
 Male  Female  
Var. verify_1day verify_1week verify_1day verify_1week 
T1 0.0665*** 0.0774*** 0.0650*** 0.0737*** 
 (0.00526) (0.00560) (0.00641) (0.00677) 
T2 0.0983*** 0.112*** 0.0904*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00521) (0.00555) (0.00630) (0.00665) 
Observations 12,725 12,725 8,428 8,428 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 2.5. Q1a – Who Chooses to Verify 
 Verified Male Verified Female 
Medium_type 0.0960*** 0.0939*** 
 (0.00658) (0.00780) 
High-type 0.162*** 0.0599*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0138) 
Constant 0.0247*** 0.0279*** 
 (0.00528) (0.00626) 
p-val (M-type =H-type) 0.000 0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 2.6. Q1b –Why Males and Females Have Differential Decisions 
 
(a) How Beauty Correlates with the Non-monotonic Decisions among Females 
 M-type females H-type females 
Var. verify_1week verify_1week 
0.0334*** -0.0500** 
 (0.0116) (0.0252) 
Constant 0.122*** 0.117*** 
 (0.00723) (0.0180) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*beauty_above_median is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not 
a user is above median of beauty within H-type females and within M-
type females respectively.  
(b) How Income Correlates with the Monotonic Decisions among Males 
 M-type males H-type males 
Var. verify_1week verify_1week 
0.0623*** 0.0738** 
 (0.00928) (0.0293) 
Constant 0.105*** 0.184*** 
 (0.00604) (0.0193) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*income_above_median is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a user is 









Table 2.7. Q2a - The Causal Effect of Verification on the Messages Others 
Initiated to Verified Users and the Quality of the Senders 
 Quantity  Quality  
 Male Female Male Female 
Var. msg_received msg_received  sender-quality sender-quality 
T1 0.470*** 1.651*** 2.348*** 4.942*** 
 (0.119) (0.253) (0.704) (1.039) 
T2 0.363*** 0.940*** 1.877* 4.465*** 
 (0.0810) (0.187) (1.036) (1.406) 
Constant 0.136*** 0.376*** 3.258*** 2.929*** 
 (0.00688) (0.0145) (0.0598) (0.0808) 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 2.8. Q2a - The Causal Effect of Verification on the Messages Others 
























Standard errors in parentheses 





 Quantity  Quality  
 Male Female Male Female 
Var. msg_received msg_received sender-quality sender-quality 
M-type 0.152*** 0.429*** 4.332*** 3.273*** (0.0141) (0.0289) (0.0952) (0.154) 
H-type 0.480*** 0.686*** 6.957*** 4.680*** (0.0247) (0.0463) (0.167) (0.246) 
L-type*T1 -0.0271 0.341 0.00718 0.0411 
 (0.644) (1.535) (3.919) (4.502) 
M-type*T1 0.426*** 1.906*** 3.090*** 5.566*** 
 (0.115) (0.232) (0.506) (0.889) 
H-type*T1 0.915*** 0.339 5.394*** 0.158 
 (0.190) (0.701) (0.884) (3.147) 
L-type*T2 
 
-0.0123 0.148 0.0538 0.153 
(0.578) (0.847) (4.364) (8.158) 
M-type*T2 
 
0.365*** 1.056*** 2.164*** 4.549*** 
(0.0747) (0.167) (0.782) (1.231) 
H-type*T2 0.728*** 0.433 4.862*** 0.451 
 (0.131) (0.592) (1.286) (3.724) 
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Table 2.9. Q2a – Messages Received across user types among Females (in 
treatment groups) 










(M-type = H-type) 
0.0001 
Standard errors in parentheses 









Table 2.10. Q2b - The Causal Effect of Verification on User’ Initiated Messages 
to Others and the Quality of the Receivers 
 Quantity  Quality  
 Male Female Male Female 
Var. msg_sent msg_sent receiver_quality receiver_quality 
T1 0.627*** 0.777*** 3.154*** 7.342*** 
 (0.141) (0.160) (0.986) (1.361) 
T2 0.401*** 0.395*** 1.922*** 4.564*** 
 (0.0958) (0.118) (0.671) (1.006) 
Constant 0.0897*** 0.108*** 3.308*** 3.414*** 
 (0.00814) (0.00921) (0.0570) (0.0783) 
Standard errors in parentheses 












Table 2.11. Q2b - The Causal Effect of Verification on User’ Initiated Messages 
to Others and the Quality of the Receivers – Decomposed by User Types 
 Quantity  Quality  
 Male Female Male Female 
Var. msg_sent msg_sent receiver_quality receiver_quality 
M-type  0.105*** 0.137*** 4.619*** 4.694*** 
(0.0175) (0.0196) (0.0895) (0.125) 
H-type  0.275*** 0.159*** 5.532*** 6.142*** 
(0.0308) (0.0313) (0.157) (0.200) 
L-type*T1  0.128 0.251 1.223 2.693 
 (0.802) (1.038) (4.099) (6.647) 
M-type*T1 0.509*** 0.889*** 3.511*** 7.294*** 
 (0.144) (0.157) (0.734) (1.003) 
H-type*T1 1.403*** 0.113 7.063*** 0.309 
 (0.236) (0.474) (1.208) (3.035) 
L-type*T2  
 
0.136 0.116 1.209 1.295 
(0.720) (0.573) (3.681) (3.669) 
M-type*T2 
 
0.369*** 0.431*** 2.676*** 4.476*** 
(0.0930) (0.113) (0.475) (0.724) 
H-type*T2 0.810*** 0.0656 4.431*** 0.543 
(0.163) (0.400) (0.831) (2.564) 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 2.12 Q3a - The Causal Effect of Verification on Final Matches Initiated by 
Others and by the Focal Verified User 









T1 0.348*** 0.311*** 0.281*** 0.526*** 
 (0.0871) (0.0601) (0.0916) (0.135) 
T2 0.212*** 0.224*** 0.122* 0.319*** 
 (0.0592) (0.0409) (0.0677) (0.1000) 
Constant 0.0417*** 0.0248*** 0.0461*** 0.0883*** 
 (0.00503) (0.00347) (0.00527) (0.00778) 
Standard errors in parentheses 









Table 2.13 Q3a - The Causal Effect of Verification on Final Matches Initiated by 
Others and by the Focal Verified User - Decomposed by User Types 









M-type  0.0494*** 0.0267*** 0.0597*** 0.116*** 
(0.0109) (0.00751) (0.0113) (0.0165) 
H-type  0.138*** 0.102*** 0.0781*** 0.200*** 
(0.0192) (0.0132) (0.0181) (0.0264) 
L-type*T1  0.0204 0.0204 0.131 0.359 
 (0.499) (0.344) (0.599) (0.875) 
M-type*T1 0.248*** 0.300*** 0.319*** 0.595*** 
 (0.0894) (0.0617) (0.0904) (0.132) 
H-type*T1 0.939*** 0.507*** 0.0169 0.0677 
 (0.147) (0.101) (0.274) (0.400) 
L-type*T2  
 
0.0347 0.0173 0.0164 0.0802 
(0.448) (0.309) (0.331) (0.483) 
M-type*T2 
 
0.188*** 0.219*** 0.136** 0.363*** 
(0.0930) (0.113) (90.81) (88.94) 
H-type*T2 0.810*** 0.0656 464.1*** 86.85 
(0.163) (0.400) (158.7) (314.9) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 3.1. Individual-level Variable Description 
Outcome Variables Description 
msg_rec_1week the total messages initiated to recommended candidates  
response_rec_1week the total responses of recommended candidates 
match_rec_1week the total matches of recommended candidates 
msg_search_1week the total messages initiated to candidates from search  
response_search_1week the total responses of candidates from search 
match_search_1week the total matches of candidates from search 
User Characteristics Description 












Table 3.2 The Number of Messages That Focal Users Initiate to Recommended 
Candidates 
 Male Female   
VARIABLES msg_rec msg_rec   
Your Preference 0.0272* 0.0238**   
 (0.0155) (0.0101)   
Potential Matches’ Preference 0.0514*** 0.0234**   
 (0.0155) (0.0101)   
Mutual Preference 0.0236* 0.0336***   
 (0.0163) (0.0106)   
Constant 0.0725*** 0.0231***   
 (0.0109) (0.00711)   
Observations 5,559 5,196   
p-value(“Your”= “Potential”) 0.119 0.968   
p-value(“Your”= “Mutual”) 0.825 0.356   
p-value(“Potential”= “Mutual”) 0.112 0.336   
Standard errors in parentheses 












Table 3.3 Desirability Comparison Between Chosen Candidates and Unchosen 
Candidates across Groups 
VARIABLES Male Female 
Your Preference -0.0145** -0.00628 
 (0.00614) (0.00416) 
Potential Matches’ Preference 0.00941 0.0117*** 
 (0.00610) (0.00416) 
Mutual Preference 0.00676 0.00313 
 (0.00656) (0.00442) 
chosen 0.0220*** 0.0201*** 
 (0.00763) (0.00576) 
Your Preference & chosen 0.0542*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.0114) (0.00853) 
Potential Matches’ Preference & chosen -0.0492*** -0.0594*** 
 (0.0111) (0.00840) 
Mutual Preference & chosen -0.0444*** -0.0375*** 
 (0.0137) (0.00954) 
Constant 8.558*** 7.854*** 
 (0.00431) (0.00299) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.4 The Number of Messages That Focal Users Initiate to and the 
Desirability of Receivers Using Search 
 Male Female Male Female   
VARIABLES msg_search msg_search charm charm   
Your Preference -0.00719 -0.000929 -0.0107 -0.0255   
 (0.0208) (0.0192) (0.0176) (0.0378)   
Potential Matches’  
Preference 
0.0167 0.00926 -0.00615 0.0188   
 (0.0207) (0.0192) (0.0176) (0.0377)   
Mutual Preference 0.0251 0.00736 0.0114 0.0379   
 (0.0218) (0.0201) (0.0185) (0.0395)   
Constant 0.261*** 0.229*** 8.026*** 7.633***   
 (0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0266)   
Observations 5,559 5,196 5,559 5,196   
p-value 
(“Your”= “Potential”) 
0.250 0.597 0.795 0.243   
p-value 
(“Your”= “Mutual”) 
0.140 0.681 0.234 0.110   
p-value 
(“Potential”= “Mutual”) 
0.700 0.925 0.344 0.629   
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3.5 The Number of Responses and Matches That Focal Users Received 
from Recommendation 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3.6 Messages That Focal Users Initiate to Candidates -Segmented by 
Search Broadness 
 Male  Female  
 Narrow Broad Narrow Broad 
VARIABLES msg_rec msg_rec msg_rec msg_rec 
     
Your Preference 0.0468** -0.0139 0.0546** 0.0230 
 (0.0224) (0.0414) (0.0230) (0.0154) 
Potential Matches’ Preference 0.0319 0.251*** 0.0317 0.0291* 
 (0.0224) (0.0418) (0.0225) (0.0154) 
Mutual Preference 0.0193 0.0330 0.0402* 0.0432*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0436) (0.0237) (0.0160) 
Constant 0.103*** 0.0535* 0.0199 0.0326*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0291) (0.0159) (0.0108) 
     
Observations 3,560 761 1,173 2,923 
R-squared 0.001 0.064 0.005 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Responses Matches 
VARIABLES Male Female Male Female 
Your Preference 0.0120* 0.00933** 0.00819 0.00566 
 (0.00663) (0.00396) (0.00545) (0.00349) 
Potential Matches’ Preference 0.0365*** 0.0219*** 0.0192*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.00661) (0.00395) (0.00543) (0.00349) 
Mutual Preference 0.0259*** 0.0188*** 0.0199*** 0.0134*** 
 (0.00696) (0.00414) (0.00572) (0.00365) 
msg_rec_1week 0.0644*** 0.118*** 0.0575*** 0.0869*** 
 (0.000861) (0.00119) (0.000708) (0.00105) 
Constant 0.0138*** -0.00255 0.00631 -0.00302 
 (0.00467) (0.00278) (0.00384) (0.00246) 
Observations 5,559 5,196 5,559 5,196 
p-value(“Your”= “Potential”) <0.001 0.001 0.043 0.024 
p-value(“Your”= “Mutual”) 0.046 0.023 0.042 0.036 
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